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Abstract
When delegating computation to a service provider, as in the cloud computing paradigm, we seek
some reassurance that the output is correct and complete. Yet recomputing the output as a check is
inefficient and expensive, and it may not even be feasible to store all the data locally. We are therefore
interested in what can be validated by a streaming (sublinear space) user, who cannot store the full input,
or perform the full computation herself. Our aim in this work is to advance a recent line of work on
“proof systems” in which the service provider proves the correctness of its output to a user. The goal is
to minimize the time and space costs of both parties in generating and checking the proof. Only very
recently have there been attempts to implement such proof systems, and thus far these have been quite
limited in functionality.
Here, our approach is two-fold. First, we describe a carefully chosen instantiation of one of the
most efficient general-purpose constructions for arbitrary computations (streaming or otherwise), due to
Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [19]. This requires several new insights and enhancements to move
the methodology from a theoretical result to a practical possibility. Our main contribution is in achieving
a prover that runs in time O(S(n) logS(n)), where S(n) is the size of an arithmetic circuit computing
the function of interest; this compares favorably to the poly(S(n)) runtime for the prover promised
in [19]. Our experimental results demonstrate that a practical general-purpose protocol for verifiable
computation may be significantly closer to reality than previously realized.
Second, we describe a set of techniques that achieve genuine scalability for protocols fine-tuned
for specific important problems in streaming and database processing. Focusing in particular on non-
interactive protocols for problems ranging from matrix-vector multiplication to bipartite perfect match-
ing, we build on prior work [8, 15] to achieve a prover that runs in nearly linear-time, while obtaining
optimal tradeoffs between communication cost and the user’s working memory. Existing techniques re-
quired (substantially) superlinear time for the prover. Finally, we develop improved interactive protocols
for specific problems based on a linearization technique originally due to Shen [34]. We argue that even
if general-purpose methods improve, fine-tuned protocols will remain valuable in real-world settings for
key problems, and hence special attention to specific problems is warranted.
1 Introduction
One obvious impediment to larger-scale adoption of cloud computing solutions is the matter of trust. In
this paper, we are specifically concerned with trust regarding the integrity of outsourced computation. If we
store a large data set with a service provider, and ask them to perform a computation on that data set, how
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can the provider convince us the computation was performed correctly? Even assuming a non-malicious
service provider, errors due to faulty algorithm implementation, disk failures, or memory read errors are not
uncommon, especially when operating on massive data.
A natural approach, which has received significant attention particularly within the theory community,
is to require the service provider to provide a proof along with the answer to the query. Adopting the
terminology of proof systems [2], we treat the user as a verifier V , who wants to solve a problem with the
help of the service provider who acts as a prover P . After P returns the answer, the two parties conduct a
conversation following an established protocol that satisfies the following property: an honest prover will
always convince the verifier to accept its results, while any dishonest or mistaken prover will almost certainly
be rejected by the verifier. This model has led to many interesting theoretical techniques in the extensive
literature on interactive proofs. However, the bulk of the foundational work in this area assumed that the
verifier can afford to spend polynomial time and resources in verifying a prover’s claim to have solved a
hard problem (e.g. an NP-complete problem). In our setting, this is too much: rather, the prover should
be efficient, ideally with effort close to linear in the input size, and the verifier should be lightweight, with
effort that is sublinear in the size of the data.
To this end, we additionally focus on results where the verifier operates in a streaming model, taking a
single pass over the input and using a small amount of space. This naturally fits the cloud setting, as the
verifier can perform this streaming pass while uploading the data to the cloud. For example, consider a
retailer who forwards each transaction incrementally as it occurs. We model the data as too large for the
user to even store in memory, hence the need to use the cloud to store the data as it is collected. Later, the
user may ask the cloud to perform some computation on the data. The cloud then acts as a prover, sending
both an answer and a proof of integrity to the user, keeping in mind the user’s space restrictions.
We believe that such mechanisms are vital to expand the commercial viability of cloud computing ser-
vices by allowing a trust-but-verify relationship between the user and the service provider. Indeed, even
if every computation is not explicitly checked, the mere ability to check the computation could stimulate
users to adopt cloud computing solutions. Hence, in this paper, we focus on the issue of the practicality of
streaming verification protocols.
There are many relevant costs for such protocols. In the streaming setting, the main concern is the space
used by the verifier and the amount of communication between P and V . Other important costs include the
space and time cost to the prover, the runtime of the verifier, and the total number of messages exchanged
between the two parties. If any one of these costs is too high, the protocol may not be useful in real-world
outsourcing scenarios.
In this work, we take a two-pronged approach. Ideally, we would like to have a general-purpose method-
ology that allows us to construct an efficient protocol for an arbitrary computation. We therefore examine the
costs of one of the most efficient general-purpose protocols known in the literature on interactive proofs, due
to Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [19]. We describe an efficient instantiation of this protocol, in which
the prover is significantly faster than in prior work, and present several modifications which we needed
to make our implementation scalable. We believe our success in implementing this protocol demonstrates
that a fully practical method for reliable delegation of arbitrary computation is much closer to reality than
previously realized.
Although encouraging, our general-purpose implementation is not yet practical for everyday use. Hence,
our second line of attack is to improve upon the general construction via specialized protocols for a large
subset of important problems. Here, we describe two techniques in particular that yield significantly more
scalable protocols than previously known. First, we show how to use certain Fast Fourier Transforms to
obtain highly scalable non-interactive protocols that are suitable for practice today; these protocols require
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just one message from P to V , and no communication in the reverse direction. Second, we describe how
to use a ‘linearization’ method applied to polynomials to obtain improved interactive protocols for certain
problems. All of our work is backed by empirical evaluation based on our implementations.
Depending on the technique and the problem in question, we see empirical results that vary in speed by
five orders of magnitude in terms of the cost to the prover. Hence, we argue that even if general-purpose
methods improve, fine-tuned protocols for key problems will remain valuable in real-world settings, espe-
cially as these protocols can be used as primitives in more general constructions. Therefore, special attention
to specific problems is warranted. The other costs of providing proofs are acceptably low. For many prob-
lems our methods require at most a few megabytes of space and communication even when the input consists
of terabytes of data, and some use much less; moreover, the time costs of P and V scale linearly or almost
linearly with the size of the input. Most of our protocols require a polylogarithmic number of messages
between P and V , but a few are non-interactive, and send just one message.
To summarize, we view the contributions of this paper as:
• A carefully engineered general-purpose implementation of the circuit checking construction of [19], along
with some extensions to this protocol. We believe our results show that a practical delegation protocol for
arbitrary computations is significantly closer to reality than previously realized.
• The development of powerful and broadly applicable methods for obtaining practical specialized pro-
tocols for large classes of problems. We demonstrate empirically that these techniques easily scale to
streams with billions of updates.
1.1 Previous Work
The concept of an interactive proof was introduced in a burst of activity around twenty years ago [3, 20,
25, 33, 34]. This culminated in a celebrated result of Shamir [33], which showed that the set of problems
with efficient interactive proofs is exactly the set of problems that can be computed in polynomial space.
However, these results were primarily seen as theoretical statements about computational complexity, and
did not lead to implementations. More recently, motivated by real-world applications involving the dele-
gation of computation, there has been considerable interest in proving that the cloud is operating correctly.
For example, one line of work considers methods for proving that data is being stored without errors by an
external source such as the cloud, e.g., [22].
In our setting, we model the verifier as capable of accessing the data only via a single, streaming pass.
Under this constraint, there has been work in the database community on ensuring that simple functions
based on grouping and counting are performed correctly; see [37] and the references therein. Other similar
examples include work on verifying queries on a data stream with sliding windows using Merkle trees [24]
and verifying continuous queries over streaming data [29].
Most relevant to us is work which verifies more complex and more general functions of the input. The
notion of a streaming verifier, who must read first the input and then the proof under space constraints,
was formalized by Chakrabarti et al. [8] and extended by the present authors in [15]. These works allowed
the prover to send only a single message to the verifier, with no communication in the reverse direction.
With similar motivations, Goldwasser et al. [19] give a powerful protocol that achieves a polynomial time
prover and highly-efficient verifier for a large class of problems, although they do not explicitly present
their protocols in a streaming setting. Subsequently, it has been noted that the information required by the
verifier can be collected with a single initial streaming pass, and so for a large class of uniform computations,
the verifier operates with only polylogarithmic space and time. Finally, Cormode et al. [17] introduce the
notion of streaming interactive proofs, extending the model of [8] by allowing multiple rounds of interaction
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between prover and verifier. They present exponentially cheaper protocols than those possible in the single-
message model of [8, 15], for a variety of problems of central importance in database and stream processing.
A different line of work has used fully homomorphic encryption to ensure integrity, privacy, and reusabil-
ity in delegated computation [18, 12, 11]. The work of Chung, Kalai, Liu, and Raz [11] is particularly
related, as they focus on delegation of streaming computation. Their results are stronger than ours, in that
they achieve reusable general-purpose protocols (even if P learns whether V accepts or rejects each proof),
but their soundness guarantees rely on computational assumptions, and the substantial overhead due to the
use of fully homomorphic encryption means that these protocols remain far from practical at this time.
Only very recently have there been sustained efforts to use techniques derived from the complexity and
cryptography worlds to actually verify computations. Bhattacharyya implements certain PCP constructions
and indicates they may be close to practical [4]. In parallel to this work, Setty et al. [31, 32] survey
results on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs), and implement a construction originally due to Ishai
et al. [21]. While their work represents a clear advance in the implementation of PCPs, our approach has
several advantages over [31, 32]. For example, our protocols save space and time for the verifier even when
outsourcing a single computation, while [31, 32] saves time for the verifier only when batching together
several dozen computations at once and amortizing the verifier’s cost over the batch. Moreover, our protocols
are unconditionally secure even against computationally unbounded adversaries, while the construction of
Ishai et al. relies on cryptographic assumptions to obtain security guarantees. Another practically-motivated
approach is due to Canetti et al. [7]. Their implementation delegates the computation to two independent
provers, and “plays them off” against each other: if they disagree on the output, the protocol identifies
where their executions diverge, and favors the one which follows the program correctly at the next step.
This approach requires at least one of the provers to be honest for any security guarantee to hold.
1.2 Preliminaries
Definitions. We first formally define a valid protocol. Here we closely follow previous work, such as [17]
and [8].
Definition 1.1 Consider a prover P and verifier V who both observe a stream A and wish to compute a
function f(A). After the stream is observed, P and V exchange a sequence of messages. Denote the output
of V on input A, given prover P and V’s random bits R, by out(V,A,R,P). V can output ⊥ if V is not
convinced that P’s claim is valid.
P is a valid prover with respect to V if for all streams A,
Pr
R
[out(V,A,R,P) = f(A)] = 1.
We call V a valid verifier for f if there is at least one valid prover P with respect to V , and for all provers
P ′ and all streams A,
Pr
R
[out(V,A,R,P ′) 6∈ {f(A),⊥}] ≤ 1/3.
Essentially, this definition states that a prover who follows the protocol correctly will always convince
V , while if P makes any mistakes or false claims, then this will be detected with at least constant probability.
In fact, for our protocols, this ‘false positive’ probability can easily be made arbitrarily small.
As our first concern in a streaming setting is the space requirements of the verifier as well as the com-
munication cost for the protocol, we make the following definition.
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Definition 1.2 We say f possesses an r-message (h, v) protocol, if there exists a valid verifier V for f such
that:
1. V has access to only O(v) words of working memory.
2. There is a valid prover P for V such that P and V exchange at most r messages in total, and the sum
of the lengths of all messages is O(h) words.
We refer to one-message protocols as non-interactive. We say an r-message protocol has dr/2e rounds.
A key step in many proof systems is the evaluation of the low-degree extension of some data at multiple
points. That is, the data is interpreted as implicitly defining a polynomial function which agrees with the
data over the range 1 . . . n, and which can also be evaluated at points outside this range as a check. The
existence of streaming verifiers relies on the fact that such low-degree extensions can be evaluated at any
given location incrementally as the data is presented [17].
Input Representation. All protocols presented in this paper can handle inputs specified in a very general
data stream form. Each element of the stream is a tuple (i, δ), where i ∈ [n] and δ is an integer (which may
be negative, thereby modeling deletions). The data stream implicitly defines a frequency vector a, where ai
is the sum of all δ values associated with i in the stream, and the goal is to compute a function of a. Notice
the function of a to be computed may interpret a as an object other than a vector, such as a matrix or a string.
For example, in the MVMULT problem described below, a defines a matrix and a vector to be multiplied,
and in some of the graph problems considered as extensions in Section 2, a defines the adjacency matrix of
a graph.
In Sections 2 and 3, the manner in which we describe protocols may appear to assume that the data
stream has been pre-aggregated into the frequency vector a (for example, in Section 3, we apply the protocol
of Goldwasser et al. [19] to arithmetic circuits whose i’th input wire has value ai). It is therefore important
to emphasize that in fact all of the protocols in this paper can be executed in the input model of the previous
paragraph, where V only sees the raw (unaggregated) stream and not the aggregated frequency vector a,
and there is no explicit conversion between the raw stream and the aggregated vector a. This follows from
observations in [8, 17], which we describe here for completeness.
The critical observation is that in all of our protocols, the only information V must extract from the data
stream is the evaluation of a low-degree extension of a at a random point r, which we denote by LDEa(r),
and this value can be computed incrementally by V using O(1) words of memory as the raw stream is
presented to V . Crucially this is possible because, for fixed r, the function a 7→ LDEa(r) is linear, and thus
it is straightforward for V to compute the contribution of each update (i, δ) to LDEa(r).
More precisely, we can write LDEa(r) =
∑
i∈[n] aiχi(r), where χi is a (Lagrange) polynomial that
depends only on i. Thus, V can compute LDEa(r) incrementally from the raw stream by initializing
LDEa(r)← 0, and processing each update (i, δ) via:
LDEa(r)← LDEa(r) + δχi(r).
V only needs to store LDEa(r) and r, which requires O(1) words of memory. Moreover, for any i, χi(r)
can be computed in O(log n) field operations, and thus V can compute LDEa(r) with one pass over the raw
stream, using O(1) words of space and log n field operations per update.
Problems. To focus our discussion and experimental study, we describe four key problems that capture
different aspects of computation: data grouping and aggregation, linear algebra, and pattern matching. We
will study how to build valid protocols for each of these problems. Throughout, let [n] = {0, . . . , n − 1}
denote the universe from which data elements are drawn.
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F2: Given a stream of m elements from [n], compute
∑
i∈[n] a
2
i where ai is the number of occurrences of
i in the stream. This is also known as the second frequency moment, a special case of the kth frequency
moment Fk =
∑
i∈[n] a
k
i .
F0: Given a stream of m elements from [n], compute the number of distinct elements, i.e. the number of i
with ai > 0, where again ai is the number of occurrences of i in the stream.
MVMULT: Given a stream defining an n × n integer matrix A, and vectors x,b ∈ Zn, determine whether
Ax = b. More generally, we are interested in the case where P provides a vector b which is claimed to
be Ax. This is easily handled by our protocols, since V can treat the provided b as part of the input, even
though it may arrive after the rest of the input.
PMWW: Given a stream representing text T = (t0, . . . , tn−1) ∈ [n]n and pattern P = (p0, . . . , pq−1) ∈
[n]q, the pattern P is said to occur at location i in t if, for every position j in P , either pj = ti+j or at least
one of pj and ti+j is the wildcard symbol ∗. The pattern-matching with wildcards problem is to determine
the number of locations at which P occurs in T .
For simplicity, we will assume the stream length n and the universe size m are on the same order of
magnitude i.e. m = Θ(n).
All four problems require linear space in the streaming model to solve exactly (although there are space-
efficient approximation algorithms for the first three [28]).
Non-interactive versus Multi-round Protocols. Protocols for reliable delegation fall into two classes:
non-interactive, in which a single message is sent from prover to verifier and no communication occurs
in the reverse direction; and multi-round, where the two parties have a sustained conversation, possibly
spanning hundreds of rounds or more. There are merits and drawbacks to each.
— Non-interactive Advantages: The non-interactive model has the desirable property that the prover can
compute the proof and send it to the verifier (in an email, or posted on a website) for V to retrieve and
validate at her leisure. In contrast, the multi-round case requires P and V to interact online. Due to round-
trip delays, the time cost of multi-round protocols can become high; moreover, P may have to do substantial
computation after each message. This can involve maintaining state between messages, and performing
many passes over the data. A less obvious advantage is that non-interactive protocols can be repeated
for different instances (e.g. searching for different patterns in PMWW) without requiring V to use fresh
randomness. This allows the verifier to amortize much of its time cost over many queries, potentially
achieving sublinear time cost per query. The reason this is possible is that in the course of a non-interactive
protocol, P learns nothing about V’s private randomness (assuming P does not learn whether V accepts or
rejects the proof) and so we can use a union bound to bound the probability of error over multiple instances.
In contrast, in the multi-round case, V must divulge most of its private random bits to P over the course of
the protocol.
— Multi-round Advantages: The overall cost in a multi-round protocol can be lower, as most non-interactive
protocols require V to use substantial space and read a large proof. Indeed, prior work [8, 15] has shown
that space or communication must be Ω(
√
n) for most non-interactive protocols [8]. Nonetheless, even for
terabyte streams of data, these costs typically translate to only a few megabytes of space and communication,
which is tolerable in many applications. Of more concern is that the time cost to the prover in known non-
interactive protocols is typically much higher than in the interactive case, though this gap is not known to
be inherent. We make substantial progress in closing this gap in prover runtime in Section 2, but this still
leaves an order of magnitude difference in practice (Section 5).
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1.3 Outline and Contributions
We consider non-interactive protocols first, and interactive protocols second. To begin, we describe in
Section 2 how to use Fast Fourier Transform methods to engineer P’s runtime in the F2 protocol of [8]
down from O(n3/2) to nearly-linear time. The F2 protocol is a key target, because (as we describe) several
protocols build directly upon it. We show in Section 5 that this results in a speedup of hundreds of thousands
of updates per second, bringing this protocol, as well as those that build upon it, from theory to practice.
Turning to interactive protocols, in Section 2.1 we describe an efficient instantiation of the general-
purpose construction of [19]. Here, we also describe efficient protocols for specific problems of high interest
including F0 and PMWW based on an application of our implementation to carefully chosen circuits. The
latter protocol enables verifiable searching (even with wildcards) in the cloud, and complements work on
searching in encrypted data within the cloud (e.g. [5]). Our final contribution in this section is to demonstrate
that the use of more general arithmetic gates to enhance the basic protocol of [19] allows us to significantly
decrease prover time, communication cost, and message cost of these two protocols in practice.
In Section 4 we provide alternative interactive protocols for important specific problems based on a
technique known as linearization; we demonstrate in Section 5 that linearization yields a protocol for F0
in which P runs nearly two orders of magnitude faster than in all other known protocols for this problem.
Finally, we describe our observations on implementing these different methods, including our carefully
engineered implementation of the powerful general-purpose construction of [19].
2 Fast Non-interactive Proofs via Fast Fourier Transforms
In this section, we describe how to drastically speed up P’s computation for a large class of specialized,
non-interactive protocols. In non-interactive proofs, P often needs to evaluate a low-degree extension at a
large number of locations, which can be the bottleneck. Here, we show how to reduce the cost of this step
to near linear, via Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) methods.
For concreteness, we describe the approach in the context of a non-interactive protocol for F2 given in
[8]. Initial experiments on this protocol identified the prover’s runtime as the principal bottleneck in the
protocol [17]. In this implementation, P required Θ(n3/2) time, and consequently the implementation fails
to scale for n > 107. Here, we show that FFT techniques can dramatically speed up the prover, leading to a
protocol that easily scales to streams consisting of billions of items.
We point out that F2 is a problem of significant interest, beyond being a canonical streaming problem.
Many existing protocols in the non-interactive model are built on top of F2 protocols, including finding
the inner product and Hamming distance between two vectors [8], the MVMULT problem, solving a large
class of linear programs, and graph problems such as testing connectivity and identifying bipartite perfect
matchings [9, 15]. These protocols are particularly important because they all achieve provably optimal
tradeoffs between space and communication costs [8]. Thus, by developing a scalable, practical protocol
for F2, we also achieve big improvements in protocols for a host of important (and seemingly unrelated)
problems.
Non-interactive F2 and MVMULT Protocols. We first outline the protocol from [8, Theorem 4] for F2 on
an n dimensional vector. This construction yields an (nα, n1−α) protocol for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, i.e. it allows
a tradeoff between the amount of communication and space used by V; for brevity we describe the protocol
when α = 1/2.
Assume for simplicity that n is a perfect square. We treat the n dimensional vector as a
√
n×√n array
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a. This implies a two-variate polynomial f over a suitably large finite field Fp, such that
∀(x, y) ∈ [√n]× [√n] : f(x, y) = ax,y.
To compute F2, we wish to compute∑
x∈[√n],y∈[√n]
a2x,y =
∑
x∈[√n],y∈[√n]
f2(x, y).
The low-degree extension f can also be evaluated at locations outside [
√
n] × [√n]. In the protocol,
the verifier V picks a random position r ∈ Fp, and evaluates f(r, y) for every y ∈ [
√
n] ([8] shows how
V can compute any f(r, y) incrementally in constant space). The proof given by P is in the form of a
degree 2(
√
n− 1) polynomial s(X) which is claimed to be∑y∈[√n] f(X, y)2. V uses the values of f(r, y)
to check that s(r) =
∑
y∈[√n] f(r, y)
2, and if so accepts
∑
x∈[√n] s(x) as the correct answer. Clearly
V’s check will pass if s is as claimed. The proof of validity follows from the Schwartz-Zippel lemma: if
s(X) 6= ∑y∈[√n] f(X, y)2 as claimed by P , then
Pr
[
s(r) =
∑
y∈[√n]
f(r, y)2
] ≤ degree(s)|Fp| = 2(
√
n− 1)
p
where p is the size of the finite field Fp. Thus, if P deviates at all from the prescribed protocol, the verifier’s
check will fail with high probability.
A non-interactive protocol for MVMULT uses similar ideas. Each entry in the output is the result of an
inner product between two vectors: a row of matrix A and vector x. Each of the n entries in the output can
be checked independently with a variation of the above protocol, where the squared values are replaced by
products of vector entries; this naive approach yields an (n3/2, n3/2) protocol for MVMULT. [15] observes
that, because x is held constant throughout all n inner product computations, V’s space requirements can be
reduced by having V keep track of hashed information, rather than full vectors. The messages from P do not
change, however, and computing low-degree extensions of the input data is the chief scalability bottleneck.
This construction yields a 1-message (n1+α, n1−α) protocol (as in Definition 1.2) for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and
this can be shown to be optimal.
2.1 Breaking the bottleneck
Since s(X) has degree at most 2
√
n−1 it is uniquely specified by its values at any 2√n locations. We show
how P can quickly evaluate all values in the set
S := {(x, s(x)) : x ∈ [2√n]}.
Since s(X) =
∑
y∈[√n] f(X, y)
2, given all values in set
T := {(x, y, f(x, y)) : x ∈ [2√n], y ∈ [√n]},
all values in S can be computed in time linear in n. The implementation of [17] calculated each value in T
independently, requiring Θ(n3/2) time overall. We show how FFT techniques allow us to calculate T much
faster.
The task of computing T boils down to multi-point evaluation of the polynomial f . It is known how
to perform fast multi-point evaluation of univariate degree t polynomials in time O(t log t), and bivariate
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polynomials in subquadratic time, if the polynomial is specified by its coefficients [27]. However, there is
substantial overhead in converting f to a coefficient representation. It is more efficient for us to directly
work with and exchange polynomials in an implicit representation, by specifying their values at sufficiently
many points.
Representing as a convolution. We are given the values of f at all points located on the [
√
n] × [√n]
“grid”. We leverage this fact to compute T efficiently in nearly linear time by a direct application of the
Fast Fourier Transform. For (x, y) ∈ [√n] × [√n], f(x, y) is just ax,y, which P can store explicitly while
processing the stream. It remains to calculate (x, y, f(x, y)) for
√
n ≤ x < 2√n. For fixed y ∈ [√n], we
may write f(X, y) explicitly as
f(X, y) =
∑
i∈[√n]
ai,yχi(X),
where χi is the Lagrange polynomial1
χi(j) =
∏
x∈[√n]\{i}
(j − i)(x− i)−1
If j 6∈ [√n], then we may write
f(j, y) =
∑
i∈[√n]
h(j)by(i)g(j − i) (1)
where by(i) = ai,y
∏
x∈[√n]\{i}
(x− i)−1,
h(j) =
j∏
k=(j+1−√n)
k,
and g(j − i) = (j − i)−1.
As a result f(j, y) can be computed as a circular convolution of by and g, scaled by h(j). That is, for a
fixed y, all values in the set Ty := {(x, y, f(x, y)) : x ∈ [2
√
n]} can be found by computing the convolution
in Equation 1, then scaling each entry by the appropriate value of h(j).
Computing the Convolution. We represent by and g by vectors of length 2
√
n over a suitable field, and
take the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of each. The convolution is the inverse transform of the inner
product of the two transforms [23, Chapter 5]. There is some freedom to choose the field over which to
perform the transform. We can compute the DFT of fy and g over the complex field C using O(
√
n log n)
arithmetic operations via standard techniques such as the Cooley-Tukey algorithm [14], and simply reduce
the final result modulo p, rounded to the nearest integer. Logarithmically many bits of precision past the
decimal point suffice to obtain a sufficiently accurate result. Since we compute O(
√
n) such convolutions,
we obtain the following result:
Theorem 2.1 The honest prover in the F2 protocol of [8, Theorem 4] requires O(n log n) arithmetic oper-
ations on numbers of bit-complexity O(log n+ log p).
1That is, the unique polynomial of degree
√
n such that χi(i) = 1, while for j 6= i ∈ [√n], χi(j) = 0. Here, the inverse is the
multiplicative inverse within the field.
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In practice, however, working over C can be slow, and requires us to deal with precision issues. Since
the original data resides in some finite field Fp, and can be represented as fixed-precision integers, it is
preferable to also compute the DFT over the same field. Here, we exploit the fact that in designing our
protocol, we can choose to work over any sufficiently large finite field Fp.
There are two issues to address: we need that there exists a DFT for sequences of length 2
√
n (or
thereabouts) in Fp, and further that this DFT has a corresponding (fast) Fourier Transform algorithm. We
can resolve both issues with the Prime Factor Algorithm (PFA) for the DFT in Fp [6]. The “textbook”
Cooley-Turkey FFT algorithm operates on sequences whose length is a power of two. Instead, the PFA
works on sequences of length N = N1 × N2 × . . . × Nk, where the Ni’s are pairwise coprime. The time
cost of the transform is O((
∑
iNi)N). The algorithm is typically applied over the complex numbers, but
also applies over Fp: it works by breaking the large DFT up into a sequence of smaller DFTs, each of size
Ni for some i. These base DFTs for sequences of length Ni exist for Fpwhenever there exists a primitive
Ni’th root of unity in Fp. This is the case whenever Ni is a divisor of p − 1. So we are in good shape so
long as p− 1 has many distinct prime factors.
Here, we use our freedom to fix p, and choose p = 261 − 1.2 Notice that
261 − 2 = 2× 32 × 52 × 7× 13× 31× 41× 61× 151× 331× 1321,
and so there are many such divisors Ni to choose from when working over Fp. If 2
√
n is not equal to a
factor of p− 1, we can simply pad the vectors fy and g such that their lengths are factors of 261 − 2. Since
261 − 2 has many small factors, we never have to use too much padding: we calculated that we never need
to pad any sequence of length 100 ≤ N ≤ 109 (good for n up to 1018) by more than 16% of its length. This
is better than the Cooley-Tukey method, where padding can double the length of the sequence.
As an example, we can work with the length N = 2×5×7×9×11×13 = 90090, sufficient for inputs
of size n = (N/2)2, which is over 109. The cost scales as (2 + 5 + 7 + 9 + 11 + 13)N = 47N . Therefore,
the PFA approach offers a substantial improvement over naive convolution in Fp, which takes time Θ(N2).
Parallelization. This protocol is highly amenable to parallelization. Observe that P performs O(√n)
independent convolutions of each of length O(
√
n) (one for each column y of the matrix ax,y), followed
by computing
∑
y a
2
x,y for each row x of the result. The convolutions can be done in parallel, and once
complete, the sum of squares of each row can also be parallelized. This protocol also possesses a simple
two-round MapReduce protocol. In the first round, we assign each column y of the matrix ax,y a unique
key, and have each reducer perform the convolution for the corresponding column. In the second round, we
assign each row x a unique key, and have each reducer compute
∑
y a
2
x,y for its row x.
2.2 Implications
As we experimentally demonstrate in Section 5, the results of this section make practical the fundamental
building block for the majority of known non-interactive protocols. Indeed, by combining Theorem 2.1 with
protocols from [8, 15], we obtain the following immediate corollaries. For all graph problems considered, n
is the number of nodes in the graph, and m is the number of edges.
Corollary 2.2 1. (Extending [8, Theorem 4.3]) For any h · v ≥ n, there is an (h, v) protocol for com-
puting the inner product and Hamming distance of two n-dimensional vectors, where V runs in time
O(n) and P runs in time O(n log n). The previous best runtime known for P was O(h2v).
2Arithmetic in this field can also be done quickly, see Section 5.1.
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2. (Extending [15, Theorem 4]) For any h ·v ≥ n, there is an (mh, v) protocol form×n integer matrix-
vector multiplication (MVMULT), where V runs in time O(mn) and P runs in time O(mn log n).
The best runtime known for P previously was O(mh2v).
3. (Extending [15, Corollary 3]) For any h · v ≥ n, there is an O(nh, v) protocol for solving a linear
program over n variables with n (integer) constraints and subdeterminants of polynomial magnitude,
where V runs in time O(n2) and P runs in time O(t(n)+n2 log n), where t(n) is the time required to
solve the linear program and its dual. The best runtime known for P previously was O(t(n) +nh2v).
4. (Extending [8, Theorem 5.4]) For any h·v ≥ n3, there is an (h, v) protocol for counting the number of
triangles in a graph, where V runs in time O(mn) and P runs in time O(n3 log n). The best runtime
known for P previously was O(h2v).
5. (Extending [9, Theorem 6.6]) For any h · v ≥ n2, h ≥ n, there is an (h, v) protocol for graph
connectivity, where P runs in time O(n2 log n) and V runs in time O(m). The best runtime known
for P previously was O(nh2v).
6. (Extending [9, Theorem 6.5]) For any h · v ≥ n2, h ≥ n, there is an (h, v) protocol for bipartite
perfect matching, where V runs in time O(m) and P runs in time O(t(n) + n2 log n), where t(n)
is the time required to find a perfect matching if one exists, or to find a counter-example (via Hall’s
Theorem) otherwise. The best runtime known for P previously was O(t(n) + h2v).
In the common case where we choose h = v, this represents a polynomial-speed up in P’s runtime.
For example, for the MVMULT problem, the prover’s cost is reduced from O(mn3/2) in prior work to
O(mn log n).
In most cases of Corollary 2.2, V runs in linear time, and P runs in nearly linear time for dense inputs,
plus the time t(n) required to solve the problem in the first place, which may be superlinear. Thus, P pays
at most a logarithmic factor overhead in solving the problem “verifiably”, compared to solving the problem
in a non-verifiable manner.
3 A General Approach: Multi-round Protocols Via Circuit Checking
In this section, we study interactive protocols, and describe how to efficiently instantiate the powerful
framework due to Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum for verifying arbitrary computations3.
A standard approach to verified computation developed in the theoretical literature is to verify properties
of circuits that compute the desired function [18, 19, 31]. One of the most promising of these is due to
Goldwasser et al., which proves the following result:
Theorem 3.1 [19] Let f be a function over an arbitrary field F that can be computed by a family of
O(logS(n))-space uniform arithmetic circuits (over F) of fan-in 2, size S(n), and depth d(n). Then, assum-
ing unit cost for transmitting or storing a value in F, f possesses a (logS(n), d(n) logS(n))-protocol re-
quiringO(d(n) logS(n)) rounds. V runs in time (n+ d(n)) polylog (S(n)) andP runs in time poly(S(n)).
Here, an arithmetic circuit over a field F is analogous to a boolean circuit, except that the inputs are
elements of F rather than boolean values, and the gates of the circuit compute addition and multiplication
over F. We address how to realize the protocol of Theorem 3.1 efficiently. Specifically, we show three
3We are indebted to these authors for sharing their working draft of the full version of [19], which provides much greater detail
than is possible in the conference presentation.
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technical results. The first two results, Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, state that for any log-space uniform circuit,
the honest prover in the protocol of Theorem 3.1 can be made to run in time nearly linear in the size of
the circuit, with a streaming verifier who uses only O(logS(n)) words of memory. Thus, these results
guarantee a highly efficient prover and a space-efficient verifier. In streaming contexts, where V is more
space-constrained than time-constrained, this may be acceptable. Moreover, Theorem 3.3 states that V can
perform the time-consuming part of its computation in a data-independent non-interactive preprocessing
phase, which can occur offline before the stream is observed.
Our third result, Theorem 3.4 makes a slightly stronger assumption but yields a stronger result: it states
that under very mild conditions on the circuit, we can achieve a prover who runs in time nearly linear in the
size of the circuit, and a verifier who is both space- and time-efficient.
Before stating our theorems, we sketch the main techniques needed to achieve the efficient implemen-
tation, with full details in Appendix A. We also direct the interested reader to the source code of our
implementations [16]. The remainder of this section is intended to be reasonably accessible to readers who
are familiar with the sum-check protocol [33, 25], but not necessarily with the protocol of [19].
3.1 Engineering an Efficient Prover
In the protocol of [19], V and P first agree on a depth d circuit C of gates with fan-in 2 that computes the
function of interest; C is assumed to be in layered form (this assumption blows up the size of the circuit by
at most a factor of d, and we argue that it is unrestrictive in practice, as the natural circuits for all four of
our motivating problems are layered, as well as for a variety of other problems described in Appendix A).
P begins by claiming a value for the output gate of the circuit. The protocol then proceeds iteratively from
the output layer of C to the input layer, with one iteration for each layer. For presentation purposes, assume
that all layers of the circuit have n gates, and let v = log n.
At a high level, in iteration 1, V reduces verifying the claimed value of the output gate to computing
the value of a certain 3v-variate polynomial f1 at a random point r(1) ∈ F3v. The iterations then proceed
inductively over each layer of gates: in iteration i > 1, V reduces computing fi−1(r(i−1)) for a certain
3v-variate polynomial fi−1 to computing fi(r(i)) for a random point r(i) ∈ F3vp . Finally, in iteration d, V
must compute fd(r(d)). This happens to be a function of the input alone (specifically, it is an evaluation of a
low-degree extension of the input), and V can compute this value in a streaming fashion, without assistance,
even if only given access to the raw (unaggregated) data stream, as described in Section 1.2. If the values
agree, then V is convinced of the correctness of the output.
We abstract the notion of a “wiring predicate”, which encodes which pairs of wires from layer i− 1 are
connected to a given gate at layer i. Each iteration i consists of an application of the standard sum-check
protocol [25, 33] to a 3v-variate polynomial fi based on the wiring predicate. There is some flexibility
in choosing the specific polynomial fi to use. This is because the definition of fi involves a low-degree
extension of the circuit’s wiring predicate, and there are many such low-degree extensions to choose from.
A polynomial is said to be multilinear if it has degree at most one in each variable. The results in this
section rely critically on the observation that the honest prover’s computation in the protocol of [19] can
be greatly simplified if we use the multilinear extension of the circuit’s wiring predicate.4 Details of this
observation follow.
As already mentioned, at iteration i of the protocol of [19], the sum-check protocol is applied to the
3v-variate polynomial fi. In the j’th round of this sum-check protocol, P is required to send the univariate
4There are other reasons why using the multilinear extension is desirable. For example, the communication cost of the protocol
is proportional to the degree of the extension used.
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polynomial
gj(Xj)=
∑
(xj+1,...,x3v)∈{0,1}3v−j
fi(r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
j−1, Xj , xj+1, . . . , x3v).
The sum defining gj involves as many as n3 terms, and thus a naive implementation of P would require
Ω(n3) time per iteration of the protocol. However, we observe that if the multilinear extension of the
circuit’s wiring predicate is used in the definition of fi, then each gate at layer i − 1 contributes to exactly
one term in the sum defining gj , as does each gate at layer i. Thus, the polynomial gj can be computed with
a single pass over the gates at layer i − 1, and a single pass over the gates at layer i. As the sum-check
protocol requires O(v) = O(logS(n)) messages for each layer of the circuit, P requires logarithmically
many passes over each layer of the circuit in total.
A complication in applying the above observation is that V must process the circuit in order to pull out
information about its structure necessary to check the validity ofP’s messages. Specifically, each application
of the sum-check protocol requires V to evaluate the multilinear extension of the wiring predicate of the
circuit at a random point. Theorem 3.2 follows from the fact that for any log-space uniform circuit, V can
evaluate the multilinear extension of the wiring predicate at any point using space O(logS(n)). We present
detailed proofs and discussions of the following theorems in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.2 For any log-space uniform circuit of size S(n), P requires O(S(n) logS(n)) time to imple-
ment the protocol of Theorem 3.1 over the entire execution, and V requires space O(logS(n)).
Moreover, because the circuit’s wiring predicate is independent of the input, we can separate V’s compu-
tation into an offline non-interactive preprocessing phase, which occurs before the data stream is seen, and
an online interactive phase which occurs after both P and V have seen the input. This is similar to [19, The-
orem 4], and ensures that V is space-efficient (but may require time poly(S(n))) during the offline phase,
and that V is both time- and space-efficient in the online interactive phase. In order to determine which
circuit to use, V does need to know (an upper bound on) the length of the input during the preprocessing
phase.
Theorem 3.3 For any log-space uniform circuit of size S(n), P requires O(S(n) logS(n)) time to im-
plement the protocol of Theorem 3.1 over the entire execution. V requires space O(d(n) logS(n)) and
time O(poly(S(n))) in a non-interactive, data-independent preprocessing phase, and only requires space
O(d(n) logS(n)) and timeO(n log n+d(n) logS(n)) in an online interactive phase, where theO(n log n)
term is due to the time required to evaluate the low-degree extension of the input at a point.
Finally, Theorem 3.4 follows by assuming V can evaluate the multilinear extension of the wiring pred-
icate quickly. A formal statement of Theorem 3.4 is in Appendix A. We believe that the hypothesis of
Theorem 3.4 is extremely mild, and we discuss this point at length in Appendix A, identifying a diverse
array of circuits to which Theorem 3.4 applies. Moreover, the solutions we adopt in our circuit-checking
experiments for F2, F0, and PMWW correspond to Theorem 3.4, and are both space- and time-efficient for
the verifier.
Theorem 3.4 (informal) Let C be any log-space uniform circuit of size S(n) and depth d(n), and as-
sume there exists a O(logS(n))-space, poly(logS(n))-time algorithm for evaluating the multilinear ex-
tension of C’s wiring predicate at a point. Then in order to to implement the protocol of Theorem 3.1
applied to C, P requires O(S(n) logS(n)) time, and V requires space O(logS(n)) and time O(n log n +
d(n)poly(logS(n))), where the O(n log n) term is due to the time required to evaluate the low-degree
extension of the input at a point.
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3.2 Circuit Design Issues
The protocol of [19] is described for arithmetic circuits with addition (+) and multiplication gates (×). This
is sufficient to prove the power of this system, since any efficiently computable boolean function on boolean
inputs can be computed by an (asymptotically) small arithmetic circuit. Typically such arithmetic circuits
are obtained by constructing a boolean circuit (with AND, OR, and NOT gates) for the function, and then
“arithmetizing” the circuit [2, Chapter 8]. However, we strive not just for asymptotic efficiency, but genuine
practicality, and the factors involved can grow quite quickly: every layer of (arithmetic) gates in the circuit
adds 3v rounds of interaction to the protocol. Hence, we further explore optimizations and implementation
issues.
Extended Gates. The circuit checking protocol of [19] can be extended with any gates that compute low-
degree polynomial functions of their inputs. If g is a polynomial of degree j, we can use gates computing
g(x); this increases the communication complexity in each round of the protocol by at most j − 2 words, as
P must send a degree-j polynomial, rather than a degree-2 polynomial.
The low-depth circuits we use to compute functions of interest (specifically, F0 and PMWW) make use
of the function f(x) = xp−1. Using only + and × gates, they require depth about log2 p. If we also use
gates computing g(x, y) = xjyj for a small j, we can reduce the depth of the circuits to about log2j p; as
the number of rounds in the protocol of [19] depends linearly on the depth of the circuit, this reduces the
number of rounds by a factor of about log2 p/ log2j p = 1/ log2j 2. At the same time this increases the
communication cost of each round by a factor of (at most) j − 2. We can optimize the choice of j. In
our experiments, we use j = 4 (so g(x, x) is x8) and j = 8 (g(x, x) = x16) to simultaneously reduce the
number of messages by a factor of 3, and the communication cost and prover runtime by significant factors
as well.
Another optimization is possible. All four specific problems we consider, F2, F0, PMWW, and MV-
MULT, eventually compute the sum of a large number of values. Let f be the low-degree extension of the
values being summed. For functions of this form, V can use a single sum-check protocol [2, Chapter 8] to
reduce the computation of the sum to computing f(r) for a random point r. V can then use the protocol
of [19] to delegate computation of f(r) to P . Conceptually, this optimization corresponds to replacing a
binary tree of addition gates in an arithmetic circuit C with a single⊕ gate with large fan-in, which sums all
its inputs. This optimization can reduce the communication cost and the number of messages required by
the protocol.
General Circuit Design. The circuit checking approach can be combined with existing compilers, such
as that in the Fairplay system [26], that take as input a program in a high-level programming language and
output a corresponding boolean circuit. This boolean circuit can then be arithmetized and “verified” by our
implementation; this yields a full-fledged system implementing statistically-secure verifiable computation.
However, this system is likely to remain impractical even though the prover P can be made to run in time
linear in the size of the arithmetic circuit. For example, in most hardware, one can compute the sum of two
32-bit integers x and y with a single instruction. However, when encoding this operation into a boolean
circuit, it is unclear how to do this with depth less than 32. At 3 log n rounds per circuit layer, for reasonable
parameters, single additions can turn into thousands of rounds.
The protocols in Section 3.3 avoid this by avoiding boolean circuits, and instead view the input directly
as elements over Fp. For example, if the input is an array of 32-bit integers, then we view each element of
the array as a value of Fp, and calculating the sum of two integers requires a single depth-1 addition gate,
rather than a depth-32 boolean circuit. However, this approach seems to severely limit the functionality that
can be implemented. For instance, we know of no compact arithmetic circuit to test whether x > y when
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viewing x and y as elements of Fp. Indeed, if such a circuit for this function existed, we would obtain
substantially improved protocols for F0 and PMWW.
This polylogarithmic blowup in circuit depth compared to input size appears inherent in any construction
that encodes computations as arithmetic circuits. Therefore, the development of general purpose protocols
that avoid this representation remains an important direction for future work.
3.3 Efficient Protocols For Specific Problems
We obtain interactive protocols for our problems of interest by applying Theorem 3.1 to carefully chosen
arithmetic circuits. These are circuits where each gate executes a simple arithmetic operation on its inputs,
such as addition, subtraction, or multiplication. For the first three problems, there exist specialized protocols;
our purpose in describing these protocols here is to explore how the general construction performs when
applied to specific functions of high interest. However, for PMWW, the protocol we describe here is the
first of its kind.
For each problem, we describe a circuit which exploits the arithmetic structure of the finite field over
which they are defined. For the latter three problems, this involves an interesting use of Fermat’s Little
Theorem. These circuits lend themselves to extensions of the basic protocol of [19] that achieve quantitative
improvements in all costs; we demonstrate the extent of these improvements in Section 5.
Protocol for F2: The arithmetic circuit for F2 is quite straightforward: the first level computes the square of
input values, then subsequent levels sum these up pairwise to obtain the sum of all squared values. The total
depth d is O(log n). This implies a O(log2 n) message (log2 n, log2 n) protocol (as per Definition 1.2).
Protocol for F0: We describe a succinct arithmetic circuit over Fp that computes F0. When p is a prime
larger than n, Fermat’s Little Theorem (FLT) implies that for x ∈ Fp, xp−1 = 1 if and only if x 6= 0.
Consider the circuit that, for each coordinate i of the input vector a, computes each ap−1i via O(log p)
multiplications, and then sums the results. This circuit has total size O(n log p) and depth O(log p). Ap-
plying the protocol of [19] to this circuit, we obtain a (log n log p, log n) protocol where P runs in time
O(n log n log p).
Protocol for MVMULT: The first level of the circuit computes Aijxi for all i, j, and subsequent levels sum
these to obtain
∑
j Aijxi. Then we use FLT to ensure that
∑
j Aijxi = bi for all i, via
∑
i
∑
j
Aijxi
− bi
p−1 .
The input is as claimed if this final output of the circuit is 0 (i.e. it counts the number of entries of b
that are incorrect). This circuit has depth O(log p) and and size O(n2 log p), and we therefore obtain an
(n+ log p log n, log n) protocol requiring O(log p log n)-rounds, where P runs in time O(n2 log p log n).
Protocol for PMWW: To handle wildcards in both T (of length n) and P (of length q), we replace each
occurrence of the wildcard symbol with 0; [13] notes that the pattern occurs at location i of T if and only if
Ii :=
q−1∑
j=0
ti+jpj(ti+j − pj)2 6= 0.
Thus, by FLT, it suffices to compute
∑n
i=0 I
p−1
i , which can be done naively by an arithmetic circuit of size
O(nq + n log p) and depth O(log p+ log q). We obtain a (log n log p, log n) protocol where P runs in time
O(n log n(q + log p)).
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For large q, a further optimization is possible: the vector I can be written as the sum of a constant
number of circular convolutions. Such convolutions can be computed efficiently using Fourier techniques
in time O(n log q) and, importantly, appropriate FFT and inverse FFT operations can be implemented via
arithmetic circuits. Thus, for q larger than log p, we can reduce the circuit size (and hence P’s runtime) in
this way, rather than by naively computing each entry of I independently.
4 Multi-Round Protocols via Linearization
In this section, we show how the technique of linearization can improve upon the general approach of Sec-
tion 2.1 for some important functions. Specifically, this technique can be applied to multi-round protocols
which would otherwise require polynomials of very high degree to be communicated. We show this in the
context of new multi-round protocols for F0 and PMWW and we later empirically observe that our new
protocol achieves a speed up of two orders of magnitude over existing protocols for F0, as well as an order
of magnitude improvement in communication cost.
Existing approaches for F0 in the multi-round setting are based on generalizations of the multi-round
protocol for F2 [17]. As described in [17], directly applying this approach is problematic: the central
function in F0 maps non-zero frequencies to 1 while keeping zero frequencies as zero. Expressed as a
polynomial, this function has degreem (an upper bound on the frequency of any item), which translates into
a factor of m in the communication required and the time cost of P . However, this cost can be reduced to
F∞, where F∞ denotes the maximum number of times any item appears in the stream. Further, if both P
and V keep a buffer of b input items, they can eliminate duplicate items within the buffer, and so ensure that
F∞ ≤ m/b. This leads to an O(log n) message, (log n, F∞ log n) multi-round protocol with P’s runtime
being O(F 2∞n log n) [17]. This protocol trades off increased communication for a quadratic improvement
in the number of rounds of communication required compared to the protocol outlined in Section 3.3 above.
4.1 Linearization Set-up
In this section we describe a new multi-round protocol for F0, and later explain how it can be modified for
PMWW. This protocol has similar asymptotic costs as that obtained in Section 3.3, but in practice achieves
close to two orders of magnitude improvement in P’s runtime. The core idea is to represent the data as a
large binary vector indicating when each item occurs in the stream. The protocol simulates progressively
merging time ranges together to indicate which items occurred within the ranges. Directly verifying this
computation would hit the same roadblock indicated above: using polynomials to check this would result in
polynomials of high degree, dominating the cost. So we use a “linearization” technique, which ensures that
the degree of the polynomials required stays low, at the cost of more rounds of interaction. This uses ideas
of Shen [34] as presented in [2, Chapter 8].
As usual, we work over a finite field with p elements, Fp. The input implicitly defines an n×m matrix
A such that Ai,j = 1 if the j’th item of the stream equals i, and Ai,j = 0 otherwise.
Working over the Boolean Hypercube. A key first step is to define an indexing structure based on the
d-dimensional Boolean hypercube, so every input point is indexed by a d bit binary string, which is the
(binary) concatenation of a log n bit string i and a logm bit string j. We view A as a function from {0, 1}d
to {0, 1} via (x1, . . . , xd) 7→ A(x1,...,xd). Let f be the unique multilinear polynomial in d variables such that
f(x1, . . . , xd) = A(x1,...,xd) for all (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ {0, 1}d, i.e. f is the multilinear extension of the function
on {0, 1}d implied by A.
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The only information that the verifier V needs to keep track of is the value of f at a random point. That
is, V chooses a random vector r = (r1, . . . , rd) ∈ Fdp. It is efficient for V to compute f(r) as V observes
the stream which defines A (and hence f ): when the j’th update is item i, this translates to the vector
v = (i, j) ∈ {0, 1}d. The necessary update is of the form f(r) ← f(r) + χv(r), where χv is the unique
polynomial that is 1 at v and 0 everywhere else in {0, 1}d. For this, V only needs to store r and the current
value of f(r).
Linearization and Arithmetized Boolean Operators. We use three operators q, Π and L on polynomials
g, defined as follows:
qkg(X1, . . . , Xk) =g(X1, . . . , Xk−1, 0) + g(X1, . . . , Xk−1, 1)
−g(X1, . . . , Xk−1, 0) · g(X1, . . . , Xk−1, 1).
Πkg(X1, . . . , Xk) = g(X1, . . . , Xk−1, 0) · g(X1, . . . , Xk−1, 1).
Lig(X1, . . . , Xk) =Xi · g(X1, . . . , Xi−1, 1, Xi+1, · · · , Xk)
+(1−Xi) · g(X1, . . . , Xi−1, 0, Xi, . . . , Xk).
q and Π generalize the familiar “OR” and “AND” operators, respectively. Thus, if g is a k-variate
polynomial of degree at most j in each variable, qk(g) and Πk(g) are k − 1-variate polynomials of degree
at most 2j in each variable. They generalize Boolean operators in the sense that if g(X1, . . . , Xk−1, 0) = x
and g(X1, . . . , Xk−1, 1) = y, and x, y are both 0 or 1, then
(qkg)(X1, . . . Xk) = 1 iff x = 1 or y = 1,
and (Πkg)(X1, . . . Xk) = 1 iff x = 1 and y = 1.
L is a linearization operator. If g is a k-variate polynomial, Li(g) is a k-variate polynomial that is linear
in variable Xi. Li operations are used to control the degree of the polynomials that arise throughout the
execution of our protocol. Since xj = x for all j ≥ 1, x ∈ {0, 1}, Li(g) agrees with g(·) on all values in
{0, 1}k.
Throughout, when applying a sequence of operations to a polynomial to obtain a new one, the operations
are applied “right-to-left”. For example, we write the k − 1 variate polynomial
(L1(L2 . . . (Lk−1(qkg)))) as L1L2 . . . Lk−1 qk g.
Rewriting F0 and PMWW. For F2 and MVMULT there is little need for linearization: the polynomials
generated remain of low-degree, so the multi-round protocols described in [17, 15] already suffice. But
linearization can help with F0 and PMWW.
Thinking of the input as a matrix A as defined above, we can compute F0 by repeatedly taking the
columnwise-OR of adjacent column pairs to end up with a vector which indicates whether item i appeared
in the stream, then repeatedly summing adjacent entries to get the number of distinct elements. When
representing these operations as polynomials, we make additional use of linearization operations to control
the degree of the polynomials that arise. Using the properties of the operations q and Li described above
and rewriting in terms of the hypercube, it can be seen that
F0(a) =
1∑
x1=0
· · ·
1∑
x
k
=0
Lk1Lk1−1 . . . L1qk1+1 Lk1+1Lk1 . . . L1 qk1+2 . . . Ld−1Ld−2 . . . L1 qd f (2)
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because this expression only involves variables and values in {0, 1}. The size of this expression is 3d2+3d2 =
O(log2 n).
The case for PMWW is similar. Assume for now that the pattern length q is a power of two (if not, it can
be padded with trailing wildcards). We now consider the input to define a matrixA of size 2n×qn, such that
A2i,qj+k(q−1) = 1 if the j’th item of the stream equals i, for all 0 ≤ k ≤ q − 1, and A2i−1,qj+2k = 1 if the
k’th character of the pattern equals i, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n−1. Wildcards in the pattern or the text are treated as
occurrences of all characters in the alphabet at that location. The problem is solved over this matrixA by first
taking the column-wise “AND” of adjacent columns: this leaves 1 where a text character matches a pattern
for a certain offset. We then take column-wise “OR”s of adjacent columns log n times: this collapses the
alphabet. Taking row-wise “AND”s of adjacent rows log q times leaves an indicator vector whose ith entry
is 1 iff the pattern occurs at location i in the text. Summing the entries in this vector provides the required
answer. Using linearization to bound the degree of q and Π operators, we again obtain an expression of size
O(log2 n).
4.2 Protocols Using Linearization
Given an expression in the form of (2), we now give an inductive description of the protocol. Conceptually,
each round we ask the prover to “strip off” the left-most remaining operation in the expression. In the
process, we reduce a claim by P about the old expression to a claim about the new, shorter expression.
Eventually, V is left with a claim about the value of f at a random point (specifically, at r), which V can
check against her independent evaluation of f(r).
More specifically, suppose for some polynomial g(X1, . . . , Xj), the prover can convince the verifier that
g(a1, a2, . . . , aj) = C with probability 1 for any (a1, a2, . . . , aj , C) where this is true, and probability less
than  when it is false. Let U(X1, X2, . . . , Xl) be any polynomial on l variables obtained as
U(X1, X2, . . . , Xl) = Og(X1, . . . , Xj),
where O is one of ∑1xi=0, Π1xi=0, q1xi=0 or Li for some variable i. (Thus l is j − 1 in the first three cases
and j in the last). Let m be an upper bound (known to the verifier) on the degree of U with respect to Xi. In
our case, m ≤ 2 because of the inclusion of Li operations in between every q and Π operation. We show
how P can convince V that U(a1, a2, . . . , al) = C ′ with probability 1 for any (a1, a2, . . . , aj , C ′) for which
it is true and with probability at most  + d/p when it is false. By renaming variables if necessary, assume
i = 1. The verifier’s check is as follows.
Case 1: O = ∑1x1=0. P provides a degree-1 polynomial s(X1) that is supposed to be g(X1, a2, . . . , aj).V checks if s(0) + s(1) = C ′. If not, V rejects. If so, V picks a random value a ∈ Fp and asks P to prove
s(a) = g(a, a2, . . . , aj). If it is one of the final d rounds, V chooses a to be the corresponding entry of r.
Case 2: O = q1x1=0X or O = Π1x1=1X . We do the same as in Case 1, but replace s(0) + s(1) with
s(0) + s(1)− s(0)s(1) in the case of q, or s(0)s(1) in the case of Π.
Case 3: O = L1. P wishes to prove that U(a1, a2, . . . , ak) = C ′. P provides a degree-2 polynomial s(X1)
that is supposed to be g(X1, a2, . . . , ak). We refer to this as “unbinding the variable” because previouslyX1
was “bound” to value a1, but now X1 is free. V checks that a1s(0) + (1−a1)s(1) = C ′. If not, V rejects. If
so, V picks random a ∈ Fp and asks P to prove s(a) = g(a, a2, . . . , ak) (or if it is the final round, V simply
checks that s(a) = f(r)).
The proof of correctness follows by using the observation that if s(X1) is not the right polynomial, then
with probability 1 − m/p, P must prove an incorrect statement at the next round (this is an instance of
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Problem Gates Size P time Rounds Communication V time
(gates) (s) (KBs) (s)
F2 +,× 0.4M 8.5 986 11.5 .01
F2 +,×,⊕ 0.2M 6.5 118 2.5 .01
F0 +,× 16M 552.6 3730 87.4 .01
F0 +,×, ˆ8 8.4M 462.2 1684 60.0 .01
F0 +,×, ˆ16 6.4M 457.4 1399 65.8 .01
F0 +,×,⊕ 15.8M 546.4 3355 78.4 .01
F0 +,×, ˆ8,⊕ 8.2M 432.6 1310 51.0 .01
F0 +,×, ˆ16,⊕ 6.2M 441.2 1024 56.8 .01
PMWW +,×, ˆ8,⊕ 9.6M 482.2 1513 56.1 .01
Table 1: Circuit checking results with n = 217.
Schwartz-Zippel polynomial equality testing procedure [30]). The total probability of error is given by a
union bound on the probabilities in each round, O(log2 n/p).
Analysis of protocol costs. Recall that both F0 and PMWW can be written as an expression of size
O(log2 n) operators, where linearization bounds the degree in any variable. Under the above procedure,
the verifier need only store r, f(r), the current values of any “bound” variables, and the most recent value
of s(a). In total, this requires space O(log n). There are O(log2 n) rounds, and in each round a polynomial
of degree at most two is sent from P to V . Such a polynomial can be represented with at most 3 words, so
the total communication is O(log2 n). Hence we obtain (log2 n, log n)-protocols for F0 and PMWW.
As the stream is being processed the verifier has to update f(r). The updates are very simple, and
processing each update requires O(d) = O(log n) time. There is a slight overhead in PMWW, where each
update in the stream requires the verifier to propagate q updates to f (assuming an upper bound on q is fixed
in advance), taking O(q) time. However, it seems plausible that these costs could be optimized further.
The prover has to store a description of the stream, which can be done in space O(n). The prover can
be implemented to require O(n log2 n) time: essentially, each round of the proof requires at most one pass
over the stream data to compute the required functions. For brevity, we omit a detailed description of the
implementation, the source code of which is available at [16].
Theorem 4.1 For any function which can be written as a concatenation of log n (binary) operators drawn
from
∑
,Π and q over inputs of size n, there is a log2 n round (log2 n, log n) protocol, where P takes time
O(n log2 n), and V takes time O(log2 n) to run the protocol, having computing the LDE of the input.
Thus we can invoke this theorem for both F0 and PMWW, obtaining log2 n round (log2 n, log n) proto-
cols for both.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We performed a thorough experimental study to evaluate the potential practical effectiveness of existing
protocols and our new ones. We summarize our findings as follows.
• The costs of our implementation of the general-purpose circuit-checking protocol described in Sec-
tion 3 are extremely attractive, with the exception of P’s runtime. The prover takes minutes to operate
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on input of size around 105: ideally, this would take seconds. The extensions we propose to the
basic protocol of [19] (such as extra types of gates) result in significant quantitative improvements
for our benchmark problems. We are optimistic about the prospects for further enhancements and
parallelization to make practical general-purpose verification a reality.
• Fine-tuned protocols for specific problems can improve over the general approach by several orders
of magnitude. Specifically, we found that extremely practical non-interactive protocols processing
hundreds of thousands of updates per second are achievable for a very large class of problems, but
only by using the methods described in Section 2. We also found that the linearization technique
results in significantly improved interactive protocols for F0 when compared to the more general
circuit-checking approach.
• Finally, we demonstrate that the non-interactive protocols are extremely amenable to parallelization,
and we believe that this makes them an attractive option for practical use.
In all of our experiments, the verifier requires significantly less space than that required to solve the
problem without a prover, and requires about the same time as that required to solve the problem without a
prover if given enough fast memory to store the whole input. Indeed, we found that in all of our protocols
memory accesses are the speed bottleneck in both V’s computation and in the computation required to solve
the problem without a prover.
Moreover, our circuit-checking results demonstrate that if we were to run our implementation on prob-
lems requiring superlinear time to solve, then V would save significant time as well as space (compared to
solving the problem without a prover). Indeed, except for circuits with very high (i.e., linear) depth, V’s
runtime in our circuit-checking implementation is grossly dominated by the time required to perform an
LDE computation via a single streaming pass over the input. The verification time, excluding this cost, is
essentially negligible.
5.1 Implementation Details
All implementations were done in C++: we simulated the computations of both parties, and measured
the time and resources consumed by the protocols. Our programs were compiled with g++ using the -O3
optimization flag. For the data, we generated synthetic streams in which each item was picked uniformly
at random from the universe, or in which frequencies of each item were chosen uniformly at random in the
range [0, 1000]. The choice of data does not affect the runtimes, which depend only on the amount of data
and not its content. Similarly the security guarantees do not depend on the data, but on the random choices
of the verifier. All computations are over the field of size p = 261 − 1, implying a very low probability of
the verifier being fooled by a dishonest prover.
We evaluated the protocols on a multi-core machine with 64-bit AMD Opteron processors and 32 GB of
memory available. Our scalability results primarily use a single core, but we also show results for parallel
operation. The large amount of memory allowed us to experiment with universes of size several billion,
with the prover able to store the full data in memory. We measured the time for V to compute the check
information from the stream, for P to generate the proof, and for V to verify the proof. We also measured
the space required by V , and the size of the proof provided by P .
Choice of Field Size. While all the protocols we implemented work over arbitrary finite fields, our choice
of Fp with p = 261 − 1 proves ideal for engineering practical protocols. First, the field size is large enough
to provide a minuscule probability of error (which is proportional to 1/p), but small enough that any field
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Figure 1: Experimental Results for both multi-round and non-interactive F2 protocols.
element can be represented with a single 64-bit data type. By using native types, we achieve a speedup of
several factors. Second, reducing modulo p can be done with a bit shift, a bit-wise AND operation, and an
addition [35]. We experienced a speedup of nearly an order of magnitude by switching to this specialized
“mod” operation rather than using “% p” operation in C++. Finally, the use of this particular field allows us
to apply FFT techniques, as described in in Section 2 (recall 261 − 2 has many small prime factors).
Correctness of protocols. In the protocols we study, the verifier’s checks of the prover’s claims are always
very simple to implement: in many cases, each check takes a single line of code to ensure that the previous
message is consistent with the new message5. Consequently, it is not difficult to implement the verifier in
a bug-free manner, and once this is the case, the verifier’s implementation serves as an independent check
on the prover’s implementation. This is because the verifier detects (with high probability) any deviations
from the prescribed protocol, and in particular V detects deviations due to an incorrect prover. Thus, we are
confident in the correctness of our implementations. More generally, this property can help in the testing
and debugging of future implementations.
5.2 Circuit Checking Protocols
In our implementation of the circuit checking method described in Section 2.1, we put significant effort into
optimizing the runtime of the prover, achieving an implementation for which P takes time nearly linear in
the size of the circuit. Nonetheless, this cost remains the chief limitation of the implementation.
We experimented with our implementation on circuits for three of our functions of interest: F2, F0 and
PMWW. We leave circuits for MVMULT to future work. Results are summarized in Table 1. Throughout,
when we refer to P’s runtime in an interactive protocol, we are referring to the total time over all rounds
of the protocol. The speed per gate can be very high: P processed circuits with tens of millions of gates
in a matter of minutes. For example, our basic implementation processed a circuit for F0 with close to 16
million gates in under 9 minutes, or close to 30,000 gates per second. However, since the circuit’s size was
more than 100 times larger than the universe over which the input is drawn, this translated to only about 300
items per second. The other costs incurred are very low. The verifier’s space usage and the communication
cost are never more than a few dozen kilobytess, and the verifier processes close to thirty million updates per
second across all stream lengths. The time for V to run the protocol is negligible compared to the (already
low) time to compute the required low-degree extension of the input.
5Things are a little more complex in the case of circuit checking, as discussed in Section 3.2, but not dramatically so.
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Figure 2: Experiments on non-interactive MVMULT protocols.
In Section 3.2, we discuss how adding additional gate types can reduce the cost of circuit checking. We
demonstrate experimentally that adding gates which compute the 8th power (ˆ8) or the 16th power (ˆ16) of
their inputs achieves substantial reductions in the size of the circuits needed. For F0, this reduced the number
of rounds by nearly a factor of three, the prover time by close to 20%, and the overall communication cost
by close to 30%. We also discuss in Section 3.2 how to (conceptually) replace a binary tree of addition gates
with a single ⊕ gate of very large fan-in which sums all its inputs. For F0, this optimization further reduced
both communication and number of rounds by 10-20%. The effect of ⊕ gates was much more pronounced
for F2, where we saw an order of magnitude reduction in the number of rounds, and 5-fold reduction in
communication cost. The change was larger here because the addition gates represent a much larger fraction
of the gates in F2 circuits than in F0 circuits.
5.3 Specialized Protocols
We now describe our experiments with specialized protocols on a problem-by-problem basis. We find
that specialized interactive protocols improve over the general-purpose construction by several orders of
magnitude. Moreover, we demonstrate that the FFT techniques of Section 2 yield non-interactive protocols
that easily scale to streams with billions of updates, improving over previous implementations by three
orders of magnitude. The protocols are of various types: the basic multi-round protocols based on sum-
check from [17] (MRS); multi-round protocols which use linearization from Section 4 (LIN); multi-round
protocols based on circuit checking described in Section 3 (CC); the basic non-interactive protocols from
[8] (NI); and the faster implementation of these protocols via FFT in Section 2 (NI-FFT).
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Figure 3: Experimental results for F0.
F2: There are four known protocols for F2: one obtained via the general-purpose circuit-checking approach
(CC), a specialized interactive protocol due to [17] (MRS), a naive implementation of the non-interactive
protocol due to [8] (NI), and a non-interactive implementation based on our FFT techniques developed in
Section 2 (NI-FFT). The results for CC are for our optimized implementation using ⊕ gates. Figures 1(b)
and 1(c) illustrate the verifier’s time and space costs for all four protocols, while Figure 1(a) illustrates the
prover’s runtime for these protocols. We used implementations of NI and MRS protocols for F2 due to
[17]. Note that in the case of NI and NI-FFT, the verifier behaves identically: the prover computes the same
messages in both cases, but more quickly using FFT.
The main observation from Figures 1(b) and 1(c) is that the verifier’s costs are extremely low for all
four protocols. V processed over 20 million items/s across all stream lengths for all protocols. The space
usage and communication cost for both interactive protocols (CC and MRS) is less than 1 kilobyte across all
stream lengths tested, while the space usage for the non-interactive case is much larger but still reasonable
(comfortably under a megabyte even for stream lengths in excess of 1 billion).
Figure 1(a) shows a clear separation between the four methods in P’s effort in generating the proof. For
large streams, it is clear that NI is not scalable, with P’s runtime growing like n3/2; this implementation
failed to process streams larger than about 40 million updates. In contrast, the FFT-based implementation
of the non-interactive protocol processed between 350, 000 and 750, 000 items per second for all tested
values of n, even for values of n well into the billions. Thus, the FFT techniques of Section 2 speed up
P’s computation by several orders of magnitude compared to the naive implementation, and allowed the
protocol to easily scale to streams with billions of items. As mentioned in Section 2, a wide variety of more
complicated protocols use this protocols as a subroutine, and therefore these non-interactive techniques are
as powerful as they are general.
For the multi-round protocols, circuit checking (CC) eventually outpaces NI, and scales linearly: the
CC prover processed about 20,000 items per second across all stream lengths. Finally, the multi-round
prover processed 20-21 million items per second. We conclude that special-purpose protocols should have
substantial value, as our specialized non-interactive protocol was faster than Circuit Checking by more than
an order of magnitude, and the specialized interactive protocol was faster by two orders of magnitude.
MVMULT: Figure 2 shows the behavior of our FFT-based implementation of the (n1+α, n1−α) non-
interactive protocol for MVMULT described in Section 2. Recall that the parameter α allows us to tradeoff
between communication and space used by the verifier. A convenient (and previously unremarked on) fea-
ture of this protocol is that when α = 0, the honest prover’s message consists simply of the vector b.
Consequently, we obtain an (n, n) protocol for which the prover can handle enormous throughputs: 30-50
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α Space Comm P time (s) V time (s)
0 78.1 KB 78.1 KB 1.6 4.3
.15 19.9 KB 468.8 KB 33.9 3.0
.20 12.8 KB 937.5 KB 58.9 2.8
.25 7.8 KB 1.52 MB 61.5 2.6
Table 2: Non-interactive MVMULT results on matrices of size 10,000 × 10,000 (763 MBs of data).
million items/second as evidenced in Figure 2(b). In outsourcing settings where one can tolerate space usage
O(n) for the verifier, this protocol is truly ideal, as the prover need do nothing more than solve the problem,
and the verifier’s computation consists only of maintaining n fingerprints. That is, this (n, n) protocol al-
lows the user to obtain a strong security guarantee on the integrity of the query, almost for free. Note that for
this problem, the size of the input is O(n2) for an n × n matrix, so O(n) space at the verifier is still much
smaller than the full input size.
The behavior becomes more interesting when we set α > 0—in this case, in addition to providing the
correct answer, the prover has to do non-trivial computation to prove correctness. Because lower values of α
mean less space but more communication (see Figure 2(c)), setting α > 0 may be needed when the verifier is
severely space-limited. It may also be necessary when the matrix is very wide: in full generality the protocol
has communication and space cost (mnα, n1−α) for an m × n matrix. We show how different costs vary
as a function of α: V’s time to process the input (Figure 2(a)), P’s time (Figure 2(b)), the communication
cost (Figure 2(d)), and the space used by V (Figure 2(c)). Across all values of α, P can process in excess
of 1 million items per second using our FFT techniques. The verifier runs over the stream slightly faster for
higher values of α, because V maintains fewer fingerprints for larger α’s. When α = 0, V processed about
20 million items per second, and when α = .25, V processed in excess of 30 million items per second. For
concreteness, Table 2 displays the costs of the protocol when run on matrices of size 10,000 × 10,000.
F0: We implemented the (log u,
√
n log u) interactive protocol of [17] described at the start of Section 4,
which we refer to as the bounded protocol (B), since it uses a bound on F∞, the maximum frequency of
any item. We compare this to the new Linearization based protocol (LIN) from Section 4.1, as well as to the
circuit checking approach (CC) of Section 2.1. The circuit-checking results shown are from our optimized
implementation using ˆ8 gates.
Our focus is primarily on P’s runtime, since we find that the bounded protocol is impractical for general
streams: P’s runtime is Θ(n2). However, recall from Section 4 that P’s run time in the bounded protocol
can be made O(F 2∞n) when there is an a priori upper bound on F∞, or equivalently when V’s memory is at
least m/F∞ for streams of length m. Figure 3(a) shows P’s runtime for the bounded protocol as a function
of the universe size n, for different bounds on F∞.
Figure 3(a) shows that for fixed F∞, the prover’s runtime in the bounded protocol grows linearly in n as
expected. When F∞ is very low, the protocol achieves reasonable throughputs, but as F∞ grows the runtime
rapidly becomes prohibitive. For example, F∞ = 30 gives about 80,000 items per second, while F∞ = 200
results in just 1,600 items/second. It is clear that this protocol will be unacceptably slow for realistic streams
where F∞ is in the thousands or larger.
In contrast, P’s runtime in the linearization and circuit checking protocols is independent of F∞. For
linearization, P’s runtime grows slightly super-linearly in n (it is Θ(n log2 n) as shown in Section 4), and
as a result the processing speed decreases slowly as the stream length increases (see Figure 3(b)). For short
streams (e.g. n = 216), P handles about 17,000 items/second. For n = 224, P handles about 8,000 items
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per second. Extrapolating the behavior to streams of length about 1 billion, P should handle about 4,500
items/second. These results are broadly consistent with its theoretical Θ(n log2 n) running-time bound, and
represents a substantial improvement over the bounded protocol and the circuit checking protocol. In the
circuit checking protocol P processes only 200-300 items per second across all stream lengths.
Note, however, that the overhead for the verifier in all three protocols is very light, making the costs
compelling from V’s perspective. In all protocols V’s space was always well under 1KB; this cost was
so low for all three protocols that we have omitted the corresponding plot. For the circuit checking and
bounded protocols, V processed about 20 million updates per second, while for the linearization protocol, V
processed 3-5 million items/second. The verifier in the bounded and circuit-checking protocols is faster than
in the linearization protocol because, in the first two, V only requires evaluating a log n-variate polynomial at
a random point, while the linearization protocol requires evaluating a log n+ logm-variate polynomial at a
random point. The communication requirement grows larger for circuit checking and the bounded protocol,
with the former approaching 100 KBs for universes of size 10 million, and the latter approaching similar
amounts of communication when F∞ = 200. In contrast, the communication under linearization was an
order of magnitude lower, never more than a few KBs on all streams tested.
In summary, the bounded protocol may be preferable when F∞ is at most a very small constant (less
than about 30); otherwise, the linearization protocol dominates, with the only downside being decreased
throughput of the verifier.
PMWW: Our experiments on pattern matching showed broadly the same relative trends as for F0 and are
omitted for brevity.
5.4 Parallel Implementations
The prover’s computations in all of the non-interactive protocols studied here are highly parallelizable, as
noted previously. Indeed, using just three OpenMP6 statements, we were able to achieve more than a 7-
fold speedup over the sequential implementation of the FFT protocol, by using all 8 cores of the multi-core
machine our experiments were run on. Consequently, with 8 processors, the ratio between the speed of the
MR and NI-FFT protocols for F2 drops from 20-60 to 3-8. In theory, the interactive F2 protocol is just as
easy to parallelize as the non-interactive protocol; however, we did not find this to be the case in practice.
The prover’s computations in the multi-round protocol are so light-weight (as evidenced by its very high
throughput) that memory access forms the principle bottleneck. In our test machine, all cores share a single
pipe to memory, and the bottleneck remains. In other scenarios, such as each core having a separate pipeline
to memory, multiple cores might yield more substantial speedups.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
The ideas and techniques from interactive proof systems have transformed the landscape of computational
complexity over the last two decades [3, 20]. Yet they have had relatively little practical impact thus far
in the area of delegated computation. In this paper, we demonstrated that, when combined with significant
engineering, interactive proof systems have sufficiently evolved to yield protocols suitable for everyday use.
A particularly encouraging feature of our experimental results is that V’s runtime is dominated by the
time required to evaluate the LDE of the input at a point r. For the low-complexity (linear or near linear
time) computations we experimented on, this cost is actually comparable to the time required to solve the
6http://www.openmp.org
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problem without a prover, assuming V had enough memory to store the input. But if we were to run our
implementation on problems requiring superlinear time to solve, then V would save significant time as well
as space (compared to solving the problem without a prover).
Moreover, if the cost of the LDE computation can be amortized over many queries, then V will save
time as well as space even for very low-complexity functions. This is indeed possible for our non-interactive
protocols, as there is no leakage of information from V to P as long as P does not learn whether V accepts
or rejects after each query; soundness is therefore maintained even if V uses the same r in all instances of
the protocol.
Such amortization for interactive protocols may also be possible in cases where P is not considered
malicious, such as a user simply trying to detect a buggy algorithm. In this setting it is reasonable to use the
same location r in all instances of the protocol even though soundness is not maintained theoretically. Thus,
in these realistic situations, the amortized time cost to the verifier can be considerably sublinear in the input
length, and our protocols will save the verifier both time and space.
The next step is to further advance the boundary of practicality. The chief obstacle for more general
systems is the requirement of a circuit representation for computations, and the superlinear dependence of
the prover’s time on the size of the circuit. Various approaches offer themselves: either to design protocols
which circumvent this circuit representation, or to improve the throughput by taking greater advantage of
the inherent parallelism in the prover’s work, e.g. via GPU implementation.
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A Details for Theorems 3.2-3.4
In this Appendix, we spell out the details of our efficient instantiation of the construction of [19]. Our
results ensure that the prover can be implemented efficiently, and that the verifier can be implemented very
efficiently for a large class of circuits.
A.1 Notation and Background
We adhere closely to the notation of [19]. We are given an arithmetic circuit C of gates with fan-in 2 over
the field F. C is in layered form and has size S(n) and depth d(n), where n is the number of input wires.
For presentation purposes, assume that all layers of the circuit have at most n gates, and write v = log n.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ d, we associate the j’th gate at layer i of C with the v-bit binary representation of j, and
for i > 1, we define two functions, addi,multi : {0, 1}3v → {0, 1} which together constitute the wiring
predicate of layer i of C. Specifically, these functions take as input three gate labels (j1, j2, j3), and return
1 if gate j1 at layer i− 1 is the addition (respectively, multiplication) of gates j2 and j3 at layer i, and return
0 otherwise. We let ˜addi, ˜multi : F3v → F denote the multilinear extensions of addi and multi respectively.
That is, ˜addi and ˜multi are the unique multilinear polynomials over F that agree with addi and multi at all
values in {0, 1}3v.
We also define a function Vi : {0, 1}v → F to represent the values of the gates at layer i. That is, Vi(j)
equals the value of gate j at layer i. Let V˜i : Fv → F denote the multilinear extension of Vi.
Recall from Section 2.1 that at iteration i of the protocol of [19], the sum-check protocol is applied to
a certain 3v-variate polynomial fi. We are ready to give the definition of fi as promised. Given a vector
x ∈ F3v, write p = (x1, . . . , xv), ω1 = (xv+1, . . . , x2v) and ω2 = (x2v+1, . . . , x3v). Then we define
fi(p, ω1, ω2) := β(p)
(
˜addi(p, ω1, ω2)(V˜i(ω1) + V˜i(ω2)) + ˜multi(p, ω1, ω2)V˜i(ω1)V˜i(ω2)
)
. (2)
Here, ˜addi, ˜multi, and V˜i are as above, and β(p) is a certain polynomial that depends only on p.
A.2 Making P Run in Time O(S(n) logS(n))
In this subsection we show how to engineer an efficient prover. First we give an informal outline, then go
on to make this more precise.
A.2.1 High-level Outline
In the j’th round of the sum-check protocol applied to fi, P is required to send the univariate polynomial
gj(Xj) =
∑
(xj+1,...,x3v)∈{0,1}3v−j
fi(r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
j−1, Xj , xj+1, . . . , x3v).
Theorems 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 rely on the observation that, when ˜addi and ˜multi are multilinear extensions,
rather than arbitrary low-degree extensions, then each gate at layers i and i − 1 contributes to exactly one
term in the sum.
More specifically, the key observation is that the multilinear extension of the wiring predicate acts as a
sum of variable-wise indicator functions on boolean-valued variables, with one indicator function for each
gate at the layer of interest. At any round j of the sum-check protocol, the “unbound” variables (i.e., those
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appearing in the sum defining gj) still only range over values in {0, 1}, and thus each gate y at the current
layer of the circuit still contributes to only one term in the sum in intermediate rounds. Namely, y contributes
to the unique term of the sum that agrees with the trailing bits in the binary representation of y, despite the
fact that “bound” variables may take values outside of {0, 1}.
A.2.2 Decomposing ˜addi and ˜multi as Sums of Variable-wise Indicator Functions
Since ˜addi and ˜multi are the multilinear extensions of the wiring predicate, we can write them explicitly as
follows.
For y ∈ {0, 1}3v let χy(x1, . . . , x3v) =
∏3v
k=1 χyk(xk), where χ0(xk) = 1− xk and χ1(xk) = xk. χy
is the unique multilinear polynomial that takes y ∈ {0, 1}3v to 1 and all other values in {0, 1}3v to 0, i.e., it
is the multilinear extension of the indicator function for boolean vector y.
Notice that if (xj+1, . . . , x3v) ∈ {0, 1}3v−j , then for any (r1, . . . rj) ∈ Fj ,
χy(r1, . . . , rj , xj+1, . . . , x3v) =
{∏j
l=1 χyl(rl), if xk = yk for all k ≥ j + 1.
0, otherwise.
(3)
Informally, Equation (3) implies that one may think of χy acting as a variable-wise indicator function
on boolean-valued variables.
Since ˜addi and ˜multi are multilinear extensions, they can be written as a sum of these χy functions,
where each gate y at layer i− 1 contributes a term χy to the sum. That is,
˜addi(x1, . . . , x3v) =
∑
add gates y at layer i−1
χy(x1, . . . , x3v) (4)
and
˜multi(x1,. . . ,x3v) =
∑
mult gatesyat layer i−1
χy(x1, . . . , x3v). (5)
It is straightforward to observe the expressions on the right hand sides of Equations (4) and (5) are
multilinear polynomials that agree with addi and multi on boolean-valued inputs, and hence the right hand
sides are equal to the multilinear extensions of addi and multi respectively.
For any vector x = (xj+1, . . . x3v) ∈ {0, 1}3v−j , and for any (r1, . . . rj) ∈ Fj , let x∗ denote the vector
x∗ := (r1, . . . , rj , xj+1, . . . , x3v) ∈ F3v,
and let Sx denote the set of gates at layer i − 1 given by {y ∈ {0, 1}3v : yk = xk for all k ≥ j + 1}.
Equations 4 and 5 imply that
˜addi(x∗) =
∑
add gates y∈Sx
(
j∏
l=1
χyl(rl)
)
, (6)
and similarly
˜multi(x∗) =
∑
mult gates y∈Sx
(
j∏
l=1
χyl(rl)
)
(7)
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A.2.3 Completing the Calculation
At round j of this sum-check protocol, the prover must compute the message
gj(Xj) =
∑
xj+1...x3v∈{0,1}3v−j
fi(r
(i)
1 , . . . , r
(i)
j−1, Xj , xj+1 . . . x3v).
Since gj has degree three if we are using multilinear extensions, it suffices for the prover to send gj(rj)
for rj ∈ {0, 1, 2}, as these evaluations uniquely define gj .
Using Equations (6) and (7), we can now easily observe that each gate at layer i − 1 contributes to
exactly one term in the sum. Specifically, for any term x = (xj+1 . . . x3v) ∈ {0, 1}3v−j in the sum, let x∗
denote the vector
x∗ := (r(i)1 , . . . , r
(i)
j , xj+1, . . . , x3v) ∈ F3v
as before, and let p∗ ∈ Fv be the first v entries of this vector, ω∗1 ∈ Fv the middle v entries, and ω∗2 ∈ Fv the
final v entries. Then combining Equations (6) and (7) with (2), we see
fi(x
∗) = β(p∗)·(( ∑
add gates y∈Sx
(
j∏
l=1
χyl(rl)
))(
V˜i(ω
∗
1) + V˜i(ω
∗
2)
)
+
( ∑
mult gates y∈Sx
(
j∏
l=1
χyl(rl)
))
· V˜i(ω∗1) · V˜i(ω∗2)
)
. (8)
Each gate y at layer i−1 is in Sx for exactly one x ∈ {0, 1}3v−j . Namely, x is the boolean vector equal
to the last 3v− j bits of the binary representation of y. Denote this vector by x(y), and similarly let x∗(y),
p∗(y), ω∗1(y) and ω∗2(y) denote the corresponding vectors implied by x(y).
Equation (8) implies that y contributes only to the term x(y) of the sum defining gj(rj) for rj ∈
{0, 1, 2}. That is, we may write
gj(rj) =
∑
add gates y at layer i−1
β(p∗(y))
(
j∏
l=1
χyl(rl)
)
(V˜i(ω
∗
1(y))+V˜i(ω
∗
2(y)))
+
∑
mult gates y at layer i−1
β(p∗(y))
(
j∏
l=1
χyl(rl)
)
·V˜i(ω∗1(y))·V˜i(ω∗2(y)).
Thus, the prover can compute gj(0), gj(1), and gj(2) with a single pass over the gates at layer i − 1.
By a similar calculation, all necessary V˜i(ω1) and V˜i(ω2) for each message of the prover can be computed
with a single pass over the gates at layer i. In conclusion, as long as we use the multilinear extension of the
circuit’s wiring predicate, the prover can compute each message at layer i with a single pass over the gates
at layer i− 1 and a single pass over the gates at layer i, performing a constant number of field operations for
each gate. Thus, the prover runs in time O(S(n) logS(n)) in total, where S(n) is the size of the circuit.
29
A.3 Finishing the Proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3
We have demonstrated that if the protocol of [19] is instantiated with the multilinear extensions of the
circuits wiring predicate and gate value function, then P can be made to run in time O(S(n) logS(n)).
All that remains in proving Theorem 3.2 is to show that for any log-space uniform circuit, the verifier can
evaluate ˜addi(p, ω1, ω2) and ˜multi(p, ω1, ω2) in space O(logS(n)). This holds because V can make an
“implicit” pass over each layer of the circuit and compute the contribution of each gate to ˜addi and ˜multi.
That is, V considers each gate y in turn, and computes y’s contribution to ˜addi and ˜multi using Equations
(4) and (5). This requires O(S(n)) time in total, but only O(logS(n)) space, since V never needs to store
an explicit representation of the circuit. Theorem 3.2 follows.
Theorem 3.3 follows from the additional observation that ˜addi and ˜multi do not depend on the input, nor
do the random coins of the verifier, and these coins uniquely determine the points at which V must evaluate
˜addi and ˜multi. Thus, V can toss all her coins in the pre-processing phase and compute the necessary
evaluations of ˜addi and ˜multi. V stores the answers and the random coins for use in the online phase. In
the online phase, V only needs to spend O(1) time per round of the protocol to check P’s messages for
consistency, and thus V takes time O(d(n) logS(n)) in the online phase.
In streaming contexts, where V is more space-constrained than time-constrained, this may be acceptable.
However, the solutions we adopt in our experimental implementation correspond to the stronger Theorem
3.4, which further reduces the space and time costs for the verifier.
A.4 Discussion and Formal Statement of Theorem 3.4
Now that we have defined the polynomial fi to which the sum-check protocol is applied in the i’th iteration
of the construction of [19], we are ready to state Theorem 3.4 formally.
Theorem A.1 (Formal statement of Theorem 3.4.) Let C be a log-space uniform circuit of size S(n) and
depth d(n), and assume there exists an O(log(S(n)))-space,
poly log(S(n))-time algorithm for evaluating ˜addi and ˜multi at a point, for all layers i of the circuit. Then
P requires O(S(n) logS(n)) time to implement the protocol of Theorem 3.1 over the entire execution. V
requires space O(logS(n)) and time O(n log n + d(n)poly(logS(n))), where the O(n log n) term is due
to the time required to evaluate the low-degree extension of the input at a point.
The remainder of this section is devoted to discussing the applicability of Theorem A.1. We believe
the assumption that the multilinear polynomials ˜addi and ˜multi can be evaluated quickly by a small-space
algorithm is mild, in both theory and practice. We demonstrate this in three ways. First, we show that all
four motivating problems in this work possess succinct circuits to which Theorem A.1 applies. Second, we
identify a host of other important circuits from the algorithmic literature to which Theorem A.1 also applies.
Third, we apply Theorem A.1 to a complicated circuit appearing in the proof of [19, Corollary 1], to obtain
improved protocols for any language decidable by a (non-deterministic) Turing Machine in small space.
In essence, Theorem A.1 applies to any circuit with a “highly regular” wiring pattern; this explains why
it applies to such a wide array of circuits. The details in the remainder of the section grow lengthy at times,
but the thesis is clear: Theorem A.1 applies to most circuits that arise in both practical applications and
theoretical constructions.
A.4.1 Wiring Predicates for F2, F0, PMWW, and MVMULT
We demonstrate that Theorem A.1 applies to all four circuits described in Section 3.
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a1  a2  a3  a4 
x  x  x  x 
+  + 
+ 
Figure 4: A circuit for F2 on 4 inputs.
1. F2: Recall that the circuit for F2 had a layer of multiplication gates used for computing the square
of each input, and then subsequent levels formed a binary tree of addition gates used to sum up the
results. A visual depiction of this circuit on n = 4 inputs is provided in Figure 4.
First, consider layer d − 1 immediately above the input gates, which consists of multiplication gates
used to square each input; both the in-neighbors of gate i at layer d−1 are equal to the i’th input gate.
Therefore, if p = (p1, . . . , pv) ∈ {0, 1}v denotes the boolean representation of a gate at layer d−1, and
ω1 = (ω1,1,. . . ,ω1,v)∈{0, 1}v and ω2 = (ω2,1,. . . ,ω2,v)∈{0, 1}v denote the boolean representation
of two gates at the input layer, then multd evaluates to true if and only if p = ω1 = ω2, while addd is
identically zero. It is easily seen that the multilinear extension of multd is the polynomial
˜multd(p,ω1,ω2)=
∏v
j=1
(
pjω1,jω2,j + (1− pj)(1− ω1j)(1− ω2,j)
)
,
while the multilinear extension of addd is the zero polynomial. Clearly, ˜multd can be evaluated at any
point in F3vp in time and space O(v) = O(log n).
The rest of the circuit for F2 consists of a binary tree of addition gates, which is used to sum up the
squared item frequencies. Thus, ˜multi is the zero polynomial for all i < d. Meanwhile, for i < d the
predicate addi(p1, ω1, ω2) evaluates to 1 if ω1 = 2p and ω2 = 2p+ 1, where here we are interpreting
p, ω1, and ω2 as integers. Thus, it can be seen that
˜addi(p, ω1, ω2) = (1− ω1,1)ω2,1 ·
v∏
j=2
(pj−1ω1,jω2,j + (1− pj−1)(1− ω1,j)(1− ω2,j)) .
Conceptually, the leading factor (1− ω1,1)ω2,1 ensures that ω1 is even (i.e. its first bit is 0) and ω2 is
odd (i.e. its first bit is 1), while the expression
n∏
j=2
(pj−1ω1,jω2,j + (1− pj−1)(1− ω1,j)(1− ω2,j))
ensures that the high-order n−1 bits of ω1 and ω2 agree with the bits of p. ˜addi is therefore the unique
multilinear polynomial evaluating to 1 on boolean inputs (p, ω1, ω2) if ω1 = 2p and ω2 = 2p + 1,
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a1  a2  a3  1 
x  x  x  x 
x  x  x  x  x  x 
x  x  x  x  x  x 
x  x  x  x  x  x 
Figure 5: The first several layers of a circuit for F0 on three inputs (in place of a fourth input is a “constant”
gate with value one) over the field Fp with p = 261 − 1. The first layer from the bottom computes a2i for
all i. The second layer from the bottom computes a4i and a
2
i for all i. The third layer computes a
8
i and
a6i = a
4
i ×a2i for all i, while the fourth layer computes a16i and a14i = a8i ×a6i for all i. The remaining layers
(not shown) have structure identical to the third and fourth layers until the value ap−1i is computed for all i,
and the circuit culminates in a binary tree of addition gates.
and evaluating to 0 otherwise. Clearly ˜addi can be evaluated at any point in time and space O(v) =
O(log n). This completes the description of ˜addi and ˜multi for all layers of the circuit for F2.
2. F0: Recall that for each of the n inputs ai, the circuit for F0 from Section 3 computes ap−1i via
O(log p) multiplications, and then sums the results via a binary tree of addition gates. We have
already seen the wiring predicate for binary trees, so here we only sketch the wiring predicate for the
ap−1i computation, omitting some details for brevity. We do so for the special case of p = 2
61 − 1,
which is the value of p used in our experiments, as this happens to have a particularly “regular” circuit
for computing ap−1; the calculation would be similar but less symmetric for other values of p.
We may write p− 1 = 261 − 2, whose binary representation is 60 1s followed by a 0. Thus, ap−1 =∏60
j=1 a
2j . The circuit computing ap−1 repeatedly squares a, and multiplies together the results “as it
goes”. In more detail, for i > 1 there are two multiplication gates at each layer d − i of the circuit
for computing ap−1; the first computes a2i by squaring the corresponding gate at layer i− 1, and the
second computes
∏i−1
j=1 a
2i−1 . See Figure 5 for a visual depiction of the first few layers of the F0
circuit.
At a high level then, the wiring predicatemulti(p, ω1, ω2) tests equality of ω1 and ω2 with two strings
that depend on the parity of p, as even values of p correspond to gates computing a2
i
while odd values
correspond to gates computing
∏i−1
j=1 a
2i−1 . Thus, we may write
˜multi(p, ω1, ω2)=(1− p1)χeven(p, ω1, ω2)+p1χodd(p, ω1, ω2),
where χodd and χeven are multilinear extensions of the appropriate equality predicates, which do not
depend on p1 (we omit a precise definition of χodd and χeven for brevity). This can clearly be evaluated
in O(v) time and space.
3. PMWW: The circuit for PMWW is similar to that for F0 so we omit the details for this circuit.
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4. MVMULT: The circuit described in Section 3 for MVMULT computes (Ax− b)i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and then applies the circuit for F0 to the result. We have already sketched the wiring predicate for F0,
so we need only describe the wiring predicate of the circuit C computing (Ax−b)i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
For presentation purposes, we only describe the wiring predicate for a circuit C ′ which computes
(Ax)i for all i. The wiring predicate for C ′ is simpler than that of C, since C requires some extra
gates to “propagate” the entries of b up to the final layer of the circuit, where they are finally used to
compute (Ax − b)i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We emphasize that Theorem A.1 applies to the circuit C as
well.
Assume n is a power of 2. To simplify the wiring predicate of C ′, we will treat C ′ as having 2n2
inputs, where the first n2 inputs of C ′ are the entries of A in row-major order; and the last n inputs
are the entries of the vector x, with all the remaining inputs (between n2 and 2n2 − n) set to 0 and
ignored in subsequent layers. We emphasize that this convention does not increase the costs to either
P or V in the protocol applied to C ′.
Each of the 2n2 inputs can be specified with 1 + 2 log n bits. Conceptually, the first bit indicates
whether the input specifies an entry of A (a zero indicates yes). The next log n bits specify the row
of A, and are zero for any entry of x. The last n bits specify the column of A or the entry of x.
We therefore write an input to a gate as h ◦ i ◦ j, where h ∈ {0, 1}, i, j ∈ {0, 1}n, and ◦ denote
concatenation.
Layer d − 1 of C ′ computes Aijxj for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n; there are therefore n2 gates at this layer, so
each gate can be specified with 2 log n bits. This layer consists only of multiplication gates, where the
first input to gate p = i◦ j has bit representation 0◦ i◦ j, while the second input has bit representation
1 ◦ 0 ◦ j. Thus, for p ∈ {0, 1}2 logn, ω1, ω2 ∈ {0, 1}2 logn+1,
˜addd(p, ω1, ω2) = 0,
while
˜multd(p, ω1, ω2) = (1− ω11)ω21·(
logn∏
k=1
(pkω1,k+1+(1−pk) (1−ω1,k+1)) (1−ω2,k+1)
)
· 2 logn∏
j=logn+1
(pkω1,k+1ω2,k+1+(1−pk) (1−ω1,k+1) (1−ω2,k+1))

Conceptually, the term (1− ω1,1)ω2,1 ensures that the first bit of ω1 is 0, and the first bit of ω2 is 1.
For p = i ◦ j, the term
logn∏
k=1
(pkω1,k+1 + (1− pk) (1− ω1,k+1)) (1− ω2,k+1)
ensures that the next log n bits of ω1 equal i, while the corresponding bits of ω2 are all 0. Finally, the
term
2 logn∏
j=logn+1
(pkω1,k+1ω2,k+1+(1− pk) (1−ω1,k+1) (1− ω2,k+1))
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ensures that the last log n bits of both ω1 and ω2 equal j.
Subsequent layers of C ′ compute
∑n
j=1Aijxj for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which is performed via a binary
tree of addition gates for each i. We have already described the predicate for this wiring pattern in the
paragraph on F2.
A.4.2 Other Circuits
Theorem A.1 applies to many other circuits that arise in the algorithms literature. Here we provide an
incomplete list, sketching the necessary observations for each.
1. Matrix Multiplication. Theorem A.1 applies to the naive circuit of size O(n3) and depth O(log n)
for multiplying two n × n matrices, which is similar to the circuit C ′ described in Section A.4.1 for
MVMULT. More generally, other multiplication algorithms, such as Strassen’s algorithm, are also
amenable to encoding as circuits, reducing the size to O(n2.807) in this case. We omit the details of
these circuits for brevity.
2. Rational permutations. Rational permutations have arisen in the study of memory hierarchies [1,
10], and capture commonly-used operations such as matrix transposition and bit-reversal. Formally,
a permutation Π on [2n] is rational if it can be expressed as a permutation pi on bit positions i.e.
Π((x1, . . . , xn)) = (xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)) [10]. There is a two-layer circuit C of size n for performing
any rational permutation (i.e. producing output wires that are the permutation of the input wires). Let
the 0’th input gate of C be a “constant gate” hard-coded to value zero. Each gate p at the non-input
layer of C is an addition gate, whose first input is the constant gate, and whose second input is Π(p).
Then ˜mult1 is the zero polynomial, while
˜add1(p, ω1, ω2) =
logn∏
j=1
(1− ω1j)
(
pjω2,pi(j) + (1− pj)(1− ω2,pi(j))
)
.
Conceptually, the (1− ω1i) term ensures that ω1 = 0 while the term (pjω2,pi(j)+(1−pj)(1−ω2,pi(j)))
ensures that ω2 = Π(p). Clearly, ˜add1 can be evaluated at a point in polylog(n) time as long as pi(i)
can be evaluated in polylog(n) time for i ∈ {0, 1}log logn.
If a rational permutation is used as an intermediate step in a computation represented by a circuit C ′,
then we need not explicitly materialize the above “rational permutation” circuit C as an intermediate
layer i of the larger circuit C ′. Rather, we can simply modify the wiring predicate of layer i of C ′
to directly apply the rational permutation to its variables. That is, we replace ˜addi(p, ω1, ω2) and
˜multi(p, ω1, ω2) with the polynomials ˜addi(p,Π(ω1),Π(ω2)) and ˜multi(p,Π(ω1),Π(ω2)). It is easy
to see that ˜addi(p,Π(ω1),Π(ω2)) and ˜multi(p,Π(ω1),Π(ω2)) are multilinear polynomials as long as
Π is a rational permutation, and these polynomials can be evaluated in polylog(n) time as long as
pi(i) can be evaluated in polylog(n) time for i ∈ {0, 1}log logn.
3. Fourier Transform. Theorem A.1 applies to an arithmetic circuit over the complex field C computing
the standard radix-two decimation-in-time FFT (the most common form of the Cooley-Tukey algo-
rithm [14]). Let x ∈ Cn be the input vector, where n is a power of 2, and let X ∈ Cn denote the
output vector. The radix-two decimation-in-time FFT relies on the following recursion: Denoting the
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even-indexed inputs x2k by Ek and the odd-indexed inputs x2k+1 by Ok, it holds that
Xk =
{
Ek + e
−2piki/nOk if k ≤ n/2
Ek−n/2 + e−2piki/nOk−n/2 ifk > n/2
The algorithm is sufficiently well-known that good introductions are readily available, along with
illustrations of a circuit implementing the above recursion [36]. Essentially, the circuit performs a
bit-reversal on its inputs (which can be implemented as a rational permutation described above), and
then executes log n “stages”, where the k’th output of stage i equals
Vi(k1, . . . , kn) = Vi−1(k1, ki−1, 0, ki, . . . , kn) + e−2piki/nVi−1(k1, . . . , ki−1, 1, ki+1, . . . kn). (9)
Here Vi−1(k) denotes the value of the k’th output of the previous stage.
The i’th stage can thus be implemented with two layers of gates; the first consists only of multiplica-
tion gates, and serves to multiply the outputs of the previous stage by the appropriate twiddle factors
(the terms of the form e−2piki/n). The second layer consists only of addition gates, and combines
outputs as in Equation (9). The wiring predicate of both layers essentially tests whether the k’th bit of
gate p is 0 or 1, and performs an appropriate equality test depending on the result. We have seen how
to write equality tests of this form as succinct multilinear polynomials in the paragraph describing the
circuit for F0 in Section A.4.1.
A.4.3 More Efficient Protocols for Space-Bounded Computation
Our final result of this section is to obtain more efficient protocols for any language decided by a non-
deterministic Turing Machine in small space. In the full version of [19], Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum
obtain the following result.
Lemma A.2 ([19], full version) Let L be any language solvable by a non-deterministic Turing Machine T
in space s(n) = Ω(log n) and time t(n). Then there is an arithmetic circuit C over an extension field of
F2 computing L, where C has size S(n) = poly(2s(n)), and depth d(n) = O(s(n) log t(n)). Moreover,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d(n), there exist polynomial extensions ˜addi and ˜multi of the functions addi and multi, where
˜addi and ˜multi have degree poly(s(n)) and can be evaluated at a point using space O(logS(n)) and time
poly(s(n)).
We show that in fact the circuit C satisfies the following stronger property:
Corollary A.3 Let C, addi and multi be as in Lemma A.2. For 1 ≤ i < d(n), the multilinear extensions
˜addi and ˜multi of the functions addi and multi, can be evaluated at a point using O(logS(n)) words of
memory and time poly(s(n)), while ˜addd(n) and ˜multd(n) can be evaluated at a point using O(logS(n))
words of memory and time O(n · s(n) log n).
Thus, Theorem A.1 implies that in applying the protocol of [19] to C, the prover can be made to run
in time O(S(n) logS(n)), rather than poly(S(n)), with a verifier who uses O(logS(n)) space and runs in
time O(n · s(n) log n+ d(n) polylog(S(n))), where S(n) is the size of C. Notice in particular that for any
language in NL, the verifier runs in time O(n log2 n).
In essence, there are two sources of overhead in the protocol implied by Lemma A.2, where by overhead
we mean the extra computation P must do to solve the problem verifiably, rather than just solving the
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problem in an an unverifiable manner. First, there is overhead in representing a uniform computation as a
(potentially large) circuitC rather than as a non-deterministic Turing Machine T . Second, there is additional
overhead caused by the fact that in Lemma A.2, the prover takes time superlinear in the size ofC. Our results
in this section remove the latter source of overhead, or at least reduce it to a logarithmic factor rather than
polynomial factor, while maintaining a super-efficient verifier.
Description of C. In order to present our result, we must first summarize the circuit C as defined in [19],
which can be described as follows. The non-deterministic Turing Machine T is assumed without loss of
generality to have a unique accepting configuration. The circuit C consists of two stages: the first stage
computes the adjacency matrix of the configuration graph of T on input x, which requires just a single layer
of gates, while the second stage determines whether there is a path from the starting configuration of T on
input x to the accepting configuration. The second stage determines whether such a path exists by a process
resembling repeated squaring of the adjacency matrix of T .
More specifically, closely following the notation in the full version of [19], a configuration of T can be
specified as a tuple u = (q, i, j, t) ∈ {0, 1}g(n), where g(n) = O(1) + log n+ log s(n) + s(n) = O(s(n)).
In this tuple, q is a boolean vector describing the machine’s state (O(1) bits), i is the boolean representation
of the location of the input-tape head (log n bits), j is the location of the work-tape head (log s(n) bits), and
t represents the contents of the work tape (s(n) bits). The configuration graph G of T is a directed acyclic
graph with 2g(n) nodes, one for each configuration of T , and an edge from u to v if T can move in one step
from configuration u to configuration v. We include self-loops in this graph.
As in the full version of [19], let Bx denote the adjacency matrix of T . The circuit C first computes the
entries of Bx, and then computes log t(n) matrices Blog t(n), . . . , B0, where the (u, v)’th entry of Bp is 1
if there is a path of length at most 2log t(n)−p from u to v in G. The matrix Bp is obtained from Bp+1 by
a process resembling repeated squaring of Bx using naive matrix multiplication.7 The wiring structure of
this stage of the circuit is similar to that for naive matrix-vector multiplication, and it is straightforward to
observe that the multilinear extensions of addi and multi for these layers can be evaluated in O(logS(n))
time and using O(logS(n)) words of space. We omit these details for brevity.
Multilinear Extension of the Remaining Layer. Thus, we need only show that the multilinear extensions
of the wiring predicate of the layer of C computing the entries of Bx can be evaluated using O(logS(n))
words of memory and O(n · s(n) log n) time. Assume that C has a designated input gate whose value is set
to 0, and another whose value is set to 1; we call these the constant-0 and constant-1 input gates, respectively.
In determining the value of Bx[u, v], the full version of [19] demonstrates that there are 4 cases to consider.
Notice configuration u only reads one input bit, bit xi.
1. Configuration u can always go to v, regardless of xi. Then Bx[u, v] = 1.
2. Configuration u can never to go v, regardless of xi. Then Bx[u, v] = 0.
3. Configuration u can go to v only if xi = 1. Then Bx[u, v] = xi.
4. Configuration u can go to v only if xi = 0. Then Bx[u, v] = 1 + xi, with arithmetic done over an
extension field of F2.
Thus, all gates are layer d(n)−1 of C are addition gates. In Case 1 above, the first input to gate (u, v) is
the constant-0 input gate, while the second is the constant-1 input gate. In Case 2, both inputs to gate (u, v)
7More specifically, Bp[u, v] = 1+
∏
w∈{0,1}g(n) (1 +Bp[u,w]Bp[w, v]) , where all arithmetic is done over an extension field
of F2.
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at layer d(n) − 1 equal the constant-0 input gate. In Case 3, the first input to gate (u, v) is the constant-0
input gate, and the second input to gate (u, v) is the i’th input gate. In Case 4, the first input to gate (u, v) is
the constant-1 input gate, and the second input to gate (u, v) is the i’th input gate.
Write u = (q1, i1, j1, t1) and v = (q2, i2, j2, t2). The fact that the multilinear extension ˜addd(n)(p, ω1, ω2)
can be evaluated usingO(logS(n)) words of memory and timeO(n ·s(n) log n) relies on the fact that com-
putation is local. More specifically, determining which of the four cases (u, v) is in depends only on the
states q1 and q2 (of which there are only O(1) possibilities), the value of the j1th bit in both t1 and t2 (of
which there are only 4 possibilities), determining whether the work-tape head can move j2 − j1 locations
to the right (this requires j2 − j1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and hence there are only O(s(n)) valid possibilities for
j2 and j1), determining whether the input-tape head can move i2 − i1 locations to the right (this requires
i2 − i1 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, and hence there are only O(n) valid possibilities for i2 and i1), and determining
whether all other entries of t1 and t2 are identical (the multilinear extension of this predicate is succinct).
For example, p is in Case 1 iff
1. All bits of t1 and t2 other than bit j1 are equal, and
2. Given state q1 and the value read by the work-tape head t1,j1 , it holds that no matter the value of xi,
the non-deterministic machine can move to state q2, move its output-tape head j2− j1 positions to the
right, set bit j1 of its work tape equal to t2,j1 , and move its input head move i2 − i1 positions to the
right.
Let S be the set of all values (q1, q2, i1, i2, j1, j2, t1,j1 , t2,j1) ∈ {0, 1}O(s(n)) values satisfying Property Two
above. Notice all elements of S can be enumerated in time O(n · s(n)).
For p = (q1, i1, j1, t1, q2, i2, j2, t2) ∈ {0, 1}2g(n), ω1, ω2 ∈ {0, 1}logn, consider the multilinear polyno-
mial
χCase 1(p, ω1, ω2) =
(∑
x∈S
χx(pS)
)
χS¯(pS¯)χ0(ω1)χ1(ω2),
where pS denotes the vector p restricted the entries corresponding to elements in S, χx is the multilinear
polynomial testing for equality with x, χS¯ is the multilinear polynomial for testing that all bits of t1 and
t2 other than i1 are equal, χ0 is the multilinear polynomial for testing that ω1 is equal to the index of the
constant-0 gate, and χ1 is the multilinear polynomial for testing that ω2 is equal to the index of the constant-
1 gate. This polynomial can clearly be evaluated in in time O(n · s(n) log n) using O(logS(n)) words of
memory, and it evaluates to 1 on boolean input (p, ω1, ω2) to 1 if p is in Case 1 and ω1 and ω2 are as required
by Case 1, and evaluates to zero otherwise.
Similar polynomials χCase 2, χCase 3, χCase 4 can be constructed for Cases 2-4. Thus, we can write
˜addi(p, ω1, ω2) =
4∑
j=1
χCase j(p, ω1, ω2),
which can clearly be evaluated in time O(n · s(n) log n) and space O(logS(n)).
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